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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the 1950s, U.S. policymakers actively encouraged Americans to participate 
in civil defense through a variety of policies. In 1958, amidst confusion concerning which of 
these policies were most efficient, President Eisenhower established the National Shelte r Plan 
and a new civil defense agency titled The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. This agency 
urged homeowners to build private fallout shelters through print media. In response, Americans 
used newspapers, magazines, and science fiction novels to contest civil defense and the foreign 
and domestic policies that it was based upon, including nuclear strategy. Many Americans re-
mained unconvinced of the viability of civil defense or feared its psychological impacts on socie-
ty. Eventually, these criticisms were able to weaken civil defense efforts and even alter nuclear 
defense strategy and missile defense technology. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 In the preface of his three part tome on the history of the nuclear disarmament movement, 
peace historian Lawrence Wittner explained that ―there is considerable reason to believe that 
government officials have been painfully conscious of – and occasionally responsive to – public 
criticism of nuclear weapons.‖1 Wittner‘s works focus on the oft overlooked struggles between 
policymakers and activists and the give-and-take policies that have resulted from these 
confrontations. In a similar fashion, and inspired by recent efforts among both peace and policy 
historians, this thesis argues that the study of popular opposition to civil defense programs 
throughout the United States during the early Cold War period can help us to understand how 
public discourse can drive and influence national policies. Specifically, during the early Cold 
War years, public policymakers hoped to encourage Americans to participate in civil defense 
efforts and build home fallout shelters. However, many everyday Americans refused to do so and 
instead presented countervailing messages through various forms of print media including 
newspapers, magazines, and science fiction novels. Their messages, alongside the broader anti-
nuclear testing movement, helped to undermine many of the harmful ideological foundations of 
civil defense policies embodied by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). 
 Post World War II civil defense programs emerged in response to the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons testing, and rampant diplomatic concerns during the 
early Cold War. While these programs were founded upon pre World War II precedents, the use 
of nuclear weapons increased both the scope and need for civilian protection and preparation for 
possible hostilities. These programs were formed in order to manage public fears, provide 
                                                                 
1
 Lawrence W ittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume One, One World or None: A History of the 
World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953. (Stanford  Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), xii. 
2 
material protection, and increase public participation toward achieving a consensus for national 
and foreign policies. As a result, these programs also became a focal point for e xpressing 
discontent toward a variety of national policies and ideologies. For many people, civil defense 
drills, educational efforts, and materials fostered an interest in peace, anti-war, and nuclear 
disarmament activities. Lawrence Wittner is one of many such examples. Wittner locates his 
interests in writing the history of international nuclear disarmament movements from his early 
experiences with school wide civil defense drills and having to wear identification plates (dog 
tags) during his childhood.2 Many others have also credited similar experiences for inspiring 
their activism against nuclear weapons. Civil defense programs worked as a catalyst for 
contesting nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and foreign policy.  
 U.S. civil defense efforts continually transformed in response to the technological 
advances in nuclear weaponry. Initially, the U.S. programs experienced difficulty in producing 
coherent policies for protection. Policymakers struggled to produce effective policies partly 
because of the rapid innovations being made in offensive weaponry research. Eventually these 
policies provoked a popular backlash and strong public opposition. By the late 1960s, the 
programs began to shift their focus from nuclear disasters toward environmentally centered ones, 
effectively keeping the civil defense agency from being discarded.  
 The opposition to civil defense has played a larger role than has often been asserted. Civil 
defense agencies sought to engage with the public directly through media campaigns. These 
campaigns created a sort of battleground between policymakers and public opposition. Remnants 
of these battles may be found in various forms of popular print media, particularly through local 
and national newspaper op-eds. There also emerged a strong current of opposition within popular 
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 Ibid., x. 
3 
fiction, television, and film productions that criticized civil defense programs and policies. These 
sources reveal how some authors disseminated a popular dismissal of civil defense to the general 
public. While these sources do not necessarily represent a majority of those involved in the 
discussions over civil defense, they certainly represent a viable and real threat to such programs. 
An in-depth analysis of some of these sources coupled with a cultural analysis reveals the 
powerful parameters that popular opposition was able to place on public policymakers, 
eventually resulting in the deterioration of civil defense programs and later nuclear defense 
programs such as missile defense. 
 My research engages with the broader studies on Cold War culture as well as peace 
studies. Historians have continued to refine and rethink the idea of a U.S. Cold War culture. 
Many of the ideas concerning a Cold War culture were distributed through academic giants such 
as Stephen Whitfield and Paul Boyer in the 1980s. Their works highlight the military, religious, 
and political emergence of a general consensus among Americans. Much of this consensus was 
focused on the expansion of the military and a national security state. 3 My work has been heavily 
influenced by Peter Kuznick‘s anthology Rethinking Cold War Culture, published in 2001.4 
Addressing the issue of how to better define what Cold War culture is, the essays in this book 
look at the precedents of Cold War culture as well as its continuities. This book points out ways 
that people contested the Cold War while nonetheless appropriating Cold War rhetoric and 
assumptions. In analyzing the opposition that arose against U.S. nuclear defense programs, my 
research largely follows this model.  
 Opposition to civil defense programs originated from across the political spectrum. 
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 Paul Boyer, By The Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age , 
1st ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Stephen Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991). 
4
 Peter Kuznick, Rethinking Cold War Culture (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).  
4 
Arguments against civil defense programs emerged from a variety of military, political, 
religious, and academic sources. Pacifists generally criticized nuclear defense for its ability to 
condition Americans toward an acceptance of an inevitable war, while militarists sometimes 
criticized the programs for their high costs and implicit acceptance of ―defeatism.‖ Historians 
have recently begun to rethink the characteristics of culture in the U.S. during the Cold War and 
this thesis seeks to add to this literature by describing and analyzing the widespread opposition to 
nuclear defense programs.  
 Peace studies have sought to highlight the importance of public opinion on nuclear 
strategies and domestic policies. While earlier interpretations of Cold War politics gave little 
agency to the protesters of the disarmament movement, more recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that public policy was often restricted by such popular movements. Most 
influential to this thesis is Lawrence Wittner‘s trilogy on global disarmament movements The 
Struggle Against the Bomb.5 Wittner argues that popular opinion and resistance through public 
demonstrations forced political leaders and national governments toward arms control 
agreements. Further, the public pressure for nuclear disarmament and arms control often took 
precedent over strategic concerns, such as deterrence theory. Largely supportive of these 
arguments, this thesis will show how print media was instrumental for this popular opposition. 
By looking at popular print media during the fight against nuclear defense programs a broader 
political scope of opposition appears.  
 
                                                                 
5
 Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume One, One World or None: A History of the World Nu c-
lear Disarmament Movement through 1953.; Lawrence W ittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume Three, 
Towards Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament, 1971 to the Present.  (Stanford  Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2003); Lawrence Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume Two, Resisting the 
Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament, 1954-1970. (Stanford  Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1997); Lawrence Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement.  
(Stanford  Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).  
5 
 Civil defense historiography also provides a solid foundation for this research. Civil 
defense has generally been studied because of its implications on civil-military relationships, 
gender and racial impacts on American culture, the American political system, popular culture, 
and military strategy.6 Specifically, Dee Garrison‘s Bracing for Armageddon highlights the 
importance of popular opposition toward civil defense drills and public rehearsals. Laura 
McEnaney‘s Civil Defense Begins at Home offers insight into the ramifications of militarizing 
the family and how these perceptions affected public dissent. Guy Oakes‘s The Imaginary War 
investigates the normalization of nuclear weapons through civil defense in order to bolster Cold 
War era foreign and domestic policies. Similarly, Andrew Grossman‘s Neither Dead Nor Red 
looks at how civil defense programs were used to create a ―garrison state‖ and increase support 
for Cold War policies. Kenneth Rose‘s One Nation Underground demonstrates the profound 
impacts of fallout shelters on American culture during the early Cold War. Finally, Tracy 
Davis‘s Stages of Emergency looks at the rehearsal aspect of civil defense drills and civil defense 
administrators‘ reasons for asking the public to engage in these activities.  
 The majority of the sources for this thesis are taken from popular print media. This 
includes popular magazines, both national and local newspapers, journals, and science fiction 
novels. Magazines such as Life, Time, and Newsweek offered space to a variety of opinions on 
civil defense. Articles published in these magazines are beneficial as they often sought to explain 
complex problems to a general readership, while also offering propositions and possible 
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 Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked. (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the 
Fifties. (Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Andrew Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red: Civil Defense 
and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. (New York: Routledge, 2001); Kenneth Rose, 
One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture. (New York: New York University Press, 
2001); Tracy Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense. (Durham  N.C.: Duke University Press, 
2007); Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture. (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1994); David Krugler, This is Only a Test: How Washington, D.C. Prepared for Nuclear War. , 1st ed. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 
1945-68. (Basingstoke  UK ;;New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
6 
solutions to these problems. Some area specific magazines will also be used such as Popular 
Science, Popular Mechanics, and The Rotarian. These offer insights into how popular writers 
often took scientifically and technologically difficult topics and conveyed them to a more general 
readership. 
 Newspapers contain many of the op-eds that were written about the civil defense 
programs. Further, since they were generally published on a daily basis, these sources offer a 
much more consistent source for the debates revolving around the various policies civil defense 
administrators implemented. While national newspapers tend to represent the broader American 
public, local newspapers will also be used to demonstrate the personal nature of such debates as 
well as their importance on local communities. In addition, the Office of Civil and Defense 
Mobilization kept track of what it considered to be ―favorable‖ op-eds that were written about its 
program.7 These lists are valuable because the favorable op-eds were often followed by a 
backlash of letters to the editor sparking local and regional debates.  
 Journals, political magazines, and newspapers provide insight into a range of opinions on 
civil defense. Political magazines such as The Nation, The National Review, and American 
Opinion offer a clear view as to how civil defense was discussed by proponents of diverse 
political ideologies. These periodicals will demonstrate the changes in rhetoric toward civil 
defense programs over time. Journals such as The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists also allow for a 
more specific look into the arguments being made against civil defense.  
 Although not unique to the early Cold War era, a relatively new genre of science fiction 
emerged in response to atomic weapons. Historian Kenneth Rose has termed this genre the 
                                                                 
7
 These can be found in the OCDM‘s own monthly newspaper. Portions of this may be found in the Geo r-
gia Archives. Georgia Department of Education, Division of Negro Education, Director of Neg ro Education Subject 
Files, RG 12-6-71, Georgia Archives. 
7 
―nuclear apocalyptic.‖ During the OCDM‘s media campaign within newspapers and magazines, 
several important novels offered commentary on civil defense planning. These novels help to 
further contextualize the debates surrounding civil defense within the period. These books were 
influential on both civil defense planners and the general public alike.  
 In order to lay the groundwork for some basic concepts surrounding civil defense, 
Chapter 1 elaborates on some of the foundational rationales and the historical background of 
civil defense programs in the United States. While this thesis specifically focuses on the Office 
of Civil and Defense Mobilization, it is important to understand its predecessor agencies and 
their contributions to civil defense planning. Also, while civil defense administrators were 
charged with disseminating information to the general public, several other key actors also 
participated in the decision making process surrounding civil defense. Some of these include 
nuclear strategists, military strategists, and local and national politicians. Understanding the 
various rationales emerging from these groups also reveals their roles and contributions to 
information that civil defense administrators relayed to the public.  
 Chapter 2 investigates the successes and failures of an intense media campaign carried 
out by the OCDM starting in 1959. This campaign hoped to increase public knowledge about the 
dangers of a nuclear war and inspire everyday Americans to build home fallout shelters. A 
barrage of pamphlets, television promotionals, and especially newspaper op-eds were presented 
to the public throughout this period. This chapter particularly focuses on the implicit and explicit 
messages that the OCDM was relaying and the responses from the general public that they then 
provoked. Americans responded in a variety of ways, and general criticism of civil defense 
seemed to increase over time. Eventually, these criticisms crippled civil defense programs based 
on protection from nuclear weapons. As a result civil defense planning shifted toward policies 
8 
focused on national disasters. While the OCDM was somewhat successful in informing 
Americans of the dangers of nuclear weaponry, their hope of arousing citizens to build fallout 
shelters was less victorious. Another powerful source in informing Americans about the dangers 
of nuclear war was an emerging genre in science fiction novels known as the ―nuclear 
apocalyptic.‖ 
 During the reign of the OCDM, there were several important nuclear apocalyptics that 
were influential in depicting the horrors of nuclear war. Chapter 3 extrapolates the messages 
found within these works and contextualizes them within the larger debates surrounding civil 
defense at the time. In addition to informing the public about the horrors of nuclear war in 
general, these novels often drew reactions from civil defense administrators as well, allowing for 
a greater understanding of how the books were perceived at the time. Understanding the 
particular elements used in depicting nuclear warfare demonstrates how writers hoped to mold 
and influence their readers‘ perceptions of civil defense. These works then became influential 
and didactic in their ability to criticize and increase the pressure on the OCDM to provide sound 
answers to difficult questions surrounding survival.  
 The Conclusion of this thesis displays some of the long term effects that the crippling of 
civil defense has had on nuclear strategies and policies. Just a decade after civil defense was 
beginning to wane, a newer and more complex system of nuclear defense emerged in its place: 
missile defense systems. In some ways, missile defense hoped to solve the same problems faced 
by civil defense programs. However, as Robert McNamara and many nuclear strategists pointed 
out later on, in order to create an effective missile defense system, a sound civil defense program 
for the public was required. Once opponents of missile defense realized the connection between 
civil defense and missile defense programs they soon began echoing the arguments made against 
9 
civil defense a decade earlier. For many, these two systems became linked and increasingly 
delegitimized by their association. Proponents of a strong missile defense system like Robert 
McNamara found themselves again trying to provide difficult answers to the American public 
revolving around their survival.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
2 CIVIL DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW AND ITS VARIOUS RATIONALES 
In the wake of WWII, Americans expressed mixed emotions about the advent of nuclear 
weapons. As cultural historian Paul Boyer has described in detail, after the initial excitement for 
the end of the war, Americans quickly expressed concern over the possibilities of nuclear wa r-
fare. These fears were allayed briefly by the nuclear testing in the Bikini Islands during Opera-
tion Crossroads in 1947, but were quickly revived with the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapo-
nry in 1949.8 In response to these fears, U.S. policymakers quickly expanded the role of civil de-
fense policies for national security. From the emergence of nuclear weapons until the mid 1960s, 
civil defense was based on a myriad of rationales. Civil defense was both informed and molded 
by national security policies. Beyond its ability to delve into national security policies, civil de-
fense is also helpful in understanding foreign policy, nuclear strategy, and domestic policies of 
the early Cold War period. These various aspects of civil defense were often interconnected and 
dynamic. In a broad sense, civil defense was a tool used to increase security through public sup-
port for national policies. It was hoped that civil defense would foster a psychologically har-
dened society in preparation for nuclear warfare. In order to understand how opponents of civil 
defense contested these programs, the historical context and rationales underlying civil defense 
must be clearly laid out.  
2.1 Organization 
In a broad sense, civil defense may be defined as any effort to provide safety for non 
military civilians in a natural or manmade disaster. During WWII, the United States and many 
other nations had civil defense programs and agencies that informed civilians on how to protect 
themselves against enemy attacks. Although civil defense existed prior to and during the Second 
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 Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, 352. 
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World War, it was fundamentally altered by the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945. After 
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Americans initially celebrated the new force of atomic 
energy. This excitement was soon replaced, however, by an overwhelming sense of concern. 
Boyer describes this circulation between hope and fear as a cyclical phenomenon occurring 
throughout the post WWII U.S. Several key events such as the Soviet acquisition of nuclear 
weaponry in 1949, extensive U.S. nuclear testing throughout the 1950s, and the partial nuclear 
test ban in 1963 have influenced this cycle of fear and hope around nuclear weaponry.  
With the successful testing of a nuclear device in 1949 by the Soviet Union, both U.S. 
policymakers and the American public became increasingly concerned over national security. 
With these concerns on the rise, policymakers amplified their civil defense efforts. December 1, 
1950 saw the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and on January 12, 
1951, Congress passed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 9 The FCDA offered the most or-
ganized efforts at domestic defense from nuclear weapons up until its replacement by the Office 
of Civil and Defense Mobilization in 1958. Nevertheless the FCDA, like its subsequent agencies, 
was riddled with dilemmas on the nature of civil defense. The agency desperately needed to de-
fine its purpose and address unanswered questions. For example, was civil defense to be a feder-
al, local, or individual responsibility? What areas in the country were considered primary targets 
for nuclear weapons: cities, suburbs, industrial, or rural ones? Who was to foot the bill for these 
programs? And what was the most effective method for ensuring personal survival? These ques-
tions particularly set back the FCDA during its eight year reign as it varied in its answers. Inevit-
ably, these questions were engaged with by policymakers and an interested public. Slowly, poli-
cymakers within the FCDA began to solidify some of these answers.  
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 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 31. 
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It should come as no surprise that civil defense increasingly became the responsibility of 
the individual throughout the early Cold War period. At the same time, this trend should not be 
viewed as an inevitable outcome of a conservative era. The debates surrounding federal, local, 
and individual responsibilities for civil defense remained throughout the FCDA and subsequent 
programs‘ existence. There were very few within these debates who favored a fully centralized 
civil defense program or an exclusively individualist approach. One example of a plan that in-
corporated elements of both individual initiative and federal encouragement was New York 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller‘s ―mandatory shelter plan,‖ that would have required homeowners 
to individually build fallout shelters within their homes with the assistance of state aid and tax 
deductions. Predictably, his plan was viewed as too centralized or intrusive by some, and not 
centralized enough by others.10 These debates carried on throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, 
but an overall consensus remained. In general, federal civil defense agencies believed it was their 
responsibility to inform citizens about civil defense and expect individual civilians to be respon-
sible for participating. This was especially the case for building home fallout shelters, which in-
creasingly became the focus for the FCDA‘s successor agency, the Office of Civil and Defense 
Mobilization.  
With the emphasis on personal responsibility for safety, concerns emerged based on the 
location of one‘s residence. Civil defense agencies were preoccupied with helping the United 
States to survive a nuclear war and therefore had to prioritize which areas were most vital to re-
covery. Cities were particularly vulnerable to nuclear attacks during the 1950s, as airplanes were 
the primary delivery system for nuclear weapons. This was problematic because cities inc luded 
much of the nation‘s industry and the largest population centers for the country. Historian David 
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 Chapter 2 discusses this in greater detail. Chet Holifield and a few others believed that an expensive and 
national civil defense program should be favored over local and ind ividual efforts. 
13 
Krugler argues that the dispersal of industry and populations from cities during the 1950s was a 
result of both long term economic and social trends as well as intentionally planned security 
measures. Specifically, Krugler demonstrates how Washington D.C. influenced federal agencies 
such as the CIA to relocate outside of the urban areas in order to maintain a ―continuity of gov-
ernment‖ in case of a nuclear attack.11 Government agencies and industry were not the only fo-
cus for dispersal however. Urbanites were also told of the dangers of residing in a city during a 
nuclear attack. The most notorious example of this message was illustrated in the 1952 FCDA 
poster titled, ―Enemy Target No.1, Civilians‖ that detailed a metal fist pounding into a citys-
cape.12 Civil defense administrators presented evacuation as a solution for fearful urbanites. As 
will be seen however, this answer only remained viable for a short time before technological in-
novations in nuclear weaponry, particularly rocketry, shortened the most valuable resource in 
evacuation efforts: time. 
Historian Andrew Grossman has explained that while urbanites were given a message of 
hopelessness from the FCDA, those in the suburbs were told something quite different. The 
FCDA‘s message to the suburbs mitigated the terrifying nature of nuclear weapons and projected 
a sense of normalcy in its place.13 A quick look at civil defense publications throughout the 
1950s and early 1960s reveals that the target audience for civil defense information was the sub-
urbs. While civil defense agencies provided information for farmers, urbanites, and industrial 
centers, the majority of its publications centered on middle class suburban families. As David 
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 The term ―continuity of government‖ was used by civil defense agencies to describe their efforts to en-
sure that national military leaders and policymakers would be ab le to survive a nuclear attack.  Krugler, This Is Only 
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 Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red, 85. 
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 Ibid. 
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Krugler has stated so succinctly, ―civil defense wasn‘t just about saving lives – it was also about 
saving a way of life‖ that was enjoyed by mostly middle class, white Americans.14   
The FCDA focused less on industrial and Agricultural civil defense, but it also addressed 
their place in the nation‘s security. Companies who participated in industrial civil defense prepa-
rations were often highlighted within civil defense publications and newsletters. FCDA and later 
OCDM publications showcased industrial civil defense efforts through pamphlets and public 
displays such as parades (See Figure 2.1). One such publication was the Standard Oil Company 
of New Jersey‘s Blueprint for Industrial Security. This publication boasted of the company‘s fal-
lout shelters for their employees and its installation of safety sprinklers on their facility‘s roof. 15  
Like industrial civil defense, rural preparations were prioritized by the OCDM because of 
their influence on American production. The economic impact of a nuclear war, it was hoped, 
could be stymied by a fortified industrial and agricultural base within the United States. During 
the early 1950s, when cities were considered to be primary targets, heavy industry was encour-
aged to decentralize. Farmers, on the other hand, were already outside of these expected target 
areas. Therefore, civil defense programs stressed rural defense much less in the early 1950s when 
compared to the years after 1954. It was only after the Castle Bravo tests in 1954 that radioactive 
fallout was beginning to emerge as the source of nuclear fears. Once fallout became more promi-
nent in civil defense discourse, so did rural civil defense. Farmers would need to protect their 
crops from wind driven fallout drifting across the countryside if agricultural production was to be 
continuous. Just as industrial defense was highlighted throughout civil defense publications, rural 
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Figure 1 - A Southern Bell float advertising its contributions to civil defense in an annual Civil Defense Week parade in Atlan-
ta, Georgia. Courtesy of the Georgia Archives, RG 22-7-46, Box 3A 
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programs were piloted and displayed throughout the country, especially during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s (See Figure 1.2). Even after suburban civil defense efforts were beginning to 
recede in the mid 1960s, rural programs continued on. In 1961, the OCDM announced a national 
youth program for rural civil defense aimed at over 3,000 counties across the U.S. The program 
was adopted by 4-H clubs, the Future Farmers of America (FFA), and the Future Housewives of 
America (FHA). It was hoped that these programs would encourage youth to lead the way in 
planning and building their own home fallout shelters, learn the importance of agricultural fallout 
protection, and encourage others to follow their lead. According to its designer W. L. Shaffer, the 
program‘s purpose was ―to help boys and girls do their share in America‘s Civil Defense mission 
in saving lives and property in event of nuclear war or natural disaster.‖16 The Rural Civil De-
fense Program received support not only in youth organizations, but also within ―the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, the Farmers Union, the American Association of 
Land Grant Colleges, and many others.17 President of the OCDM at the time Leo Hoegh ex-
plained that, ―In all of America‘s past wars, the rural people of this country have never been 
found wanting. If this nation ever again is attacked, its ultimate victory will depend heavily on 
the ability of our farmers to survive, to sustain themselves, and then to provide the whole nation 
with the food and other things needed for survival and recovery.‖18 
Civil defense was never exclusively about material and human protection however. His-
torian Jenny Barker-Devine has explained that ―the rhetoric of these programs reinforced the no-
tion that rural Americans contributed not only food and raw materials to the American economy,  
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Figure 2 - The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization exhibiting a family fallout shelter during a civil defense fair, ca. 1960. 
Courtesy of the National Archives, Photo No. 311-D-9(1)
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but also served as the moral backbone of a democratic nation.‖19 Rural residents were not only 
expected to survive in order to continue food production, but were also viewed as a ―moral base 
of the nation, responsible for taking in refugees.‖20 Rural preparations would include the possi-
bility of taking in urban and suburban survivors who would need food, shelter and healthcare. 
Because of these responsibilities, rural civil defense became increasingly important as nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems increased in speed and power.  
With all of these questions being slowly answered by the FCDA, there were two in par-
ticular that continued to plague the agency until its disbandment in 1958. First, who was to foot 
the bill for national preparedness from nuclear weapons? Second, what was the best method to-
ward insuring survival? These two questions were argued over by policymakers and the general 
public alike. While many people followed the logic that civil defense was an individual respo n-
sibility, this became increasingly contested as the nuclear arms race and testing amplified. By the 
late 1950s, concerns emerged over the Soviet civil defense preparations in comparison to those 
of the U.S. As one article claimed, the Soviets had spent ―between six and 12 times as much as… 
spent for training and information distribution by the Federal, state and local governments in the 
United States during fiscal 1960.‖21 The conservative National Review also expressed concerns 
in 1960 that U.S. ―cities are more vulnerable than Russian cities, and we trail Russia in develop-
ing a civil defense system.‖22 With burgeoning concerns about the costs of civil defense, some 
began to call for a more centralized role in providing protection.  
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The second question was the most difficult one faced by the FCDA during its reign. As 
David Krugler has asked, was one supposed to flee ―downtown, out of town, or underground?‖ 23 
In other words, what was the best method for physically protecting oneself from a nuclear at-
tack? Was it community fallout shelters in cities, dispersal to rural areas, or individual fallout 
shelters? Each of these methods were emphasized simultaneously throughout the 1950s. Dispe r-
sal was primarily focused on making permanent relocations, such as those that David Krugler 
has researched surrounding Washington D.C.  This was widely manifest by the relocation of fed-
eral buildings and the formation of ―green belts.‖24 Dispersal was a preparation that was to be 
pursued prior to an attack. As mentioned earlier, this was particularly a motivation for industrial 
civil defense. As historian Margaret Pugh O‘Mara has explained, the military- industrial-
academic complex gave rise to high tech industry throughout the early Cold War era. These in-
dustries were willing to locate their plants and offices into the peripheries of larger cities and o f-
ten received significant federal funding for doing so.25 Pugh O‘Mara‘s Cities of Knowledge looks 
at how high-tech industry suburbanized. She explains that, ―Concern about the vulnerability of 
central business districts during nuclear attack prompted officials to build in a number of power-
ful incentives into federal defense contracting policy that encouraged contractors to choose sub-
urban locations over urban ones.‖26 Because dispersal mainly applied to those in government and 
industries tied to the military- industrial-academic complex, this option was more or less removed 
from the larger debate surrounding everyday citizens. The choice facing most of the population 
was one between evacuation and shelter building. 
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Evacuation was especially stressed in the 1950s and was manifest throughout the many 
drills held during the era. From 1954 until 1961, the largest series of these drills occurred annua l-
ly. These drills were named Operation Alerts, or simply the acronym OPALs. The first of these 
drills, OPAL 54, involved only those who worked within the FCDA. From 1955 to 1961, the 
drills became increasingly more inclusive, calling for the participation of everyday Americans. 
These drills also became increasingly more accurate in representing the effects of nuclear wea-
pons. However, drills only began to address the issue of fallout later on.27  
These drills, and other civil defense preparations, may best be understood as rehearsals. 
Historian Tracy Davis explains that, ―Rehearsal was the predominant technique of exploring the 
viability of civil defense plans and policies.‖28 Because the drills requested (and sometimes re-
quired) citizens‘ involvement in civil defense, they became the initial site for protesting the pro-
gram. As more people became involved in the OPALs each year, protest began to kindle and in-
crease. According to historian Dee Garrison, ―Operation Alert failed partly because its obser-
vance required that the public be given enough information to justify a civil defense program and 
to ensure widespread public cooperation with civil defense drills.‖29 One of the first influential 
people during these protests was the Catholic social activist Dorothy Day. She was arrested dur-
ing OPALs 55 through 57. Civil rights activist Bayard Rustin was also influential in the protests, 
as the War Resisters League (WRL) participated in civil disobedience during OPAL 55. Each 
year, protestors increasingly ramped up their efforts against the OPALs. This was particularly 
true for OPAL 58. The 1958 drill was bolstered by international attention being given to The 
Golden Rule, a vessel captained by anti nuclear activist Albert Bigelow that attempted to sail into 
the U.S. military‘s nuclear testing zone in May. These efforts spurred similar anti-testing move-
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ments across the country, such as Dorothy Hutchinson and other protestors fasting inside the 
Atomic Energy Commission‘s headquarters in Germantown, Pennsylvania. 30 In 1959, activists 
Mary Sharmat and Janice Smith refused to participate in OPAL 59 and began encouraging others 
to join them with the Women Strike for Peace (WSP). According to Garrison, by 1960 the pro-
tests against civil defense had become national in scope. 31 
2.2 Reformation 
Increasing protest against the OPAL drills coupled with the FCDA‘s difficulty in settling 
the shelter vs. evacuation debate placed civil defense in a tough spot. The centralized vs. individ-
ual approaches to civil defense were also relentless as civil defense proponent Chet Holifield 
chaired a congressional committee that recommended that civil defense be primarily a federal 
responsibility to its citizens.32 With these two questions on the table and in the midst of growing 
protest, President Eisenhower decided to reform civil defense through the creation of a National 
Shelter Policy and the establishment of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) in 
1958. This approach effectively answered the two dominant questions. Civil defense was to be 
an individual responsibility and shelters from fallout (not blast) would provide the most practical 
answer to insuring personal survival.  
Announced in May 1958, the National Shelter Policy held ―that in the event of enemy at-
tack, fallout shelters offer the best single non-military protective measure for the greatest number 
of people.‖33 This policy was encouraged among local and state governments and industrial and 
rural regions. Once this policy was laid out, the OCDM initiated a highly concentrated media 
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campaign targeting suburban families, particularly housewives. This period within civil defense 
offers an excellent window into the ideological protest against the program. It was at this point 
that the messages, rationales, and rhetoric surrounding civil defense were most consolidated. Fa l-
lout shelters were to provide safety for Americans and it was to be an individual responsibility. 
Just as the OPALs had encouraged physical protests and refusals to participate in civil defense, 
the OCDM‘s media campaign also received a strong ideological backlash. Because civil defense 
was based upon national security, foreign policy, and nuclear strategy, these aspects of the pro-
gram were also heavily contested in print media. Just as Chet Holifield and others had accused 
civil defense of being a ―phantom‖ program existing primarily to ease American‘s nuclear anxie-
ties, civil defense opponents soon adopted this claim and argued that Americans were being 
―conditioned‖ to accept an inevitable war.34 The OCDM only lasted three years and was 
scrapped in 1961. Nonetheless, it offers an excellent view into the ideological claims of civil de-
fense as well as the concerns of those arguing against its existence.35  
2.3 Decline 
In a sense, the United States‘ civil defense program went out with a bang. Taking office 
in 1961, President Kennedy had been a long time proponent of civil defense efforts. Once in o f-
fice, Kennedy established and worked with the new Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the succes-
sor of the recently scrapped OCDM. Kennedy held strong to his convictions on civil defense and 
secured massive congressional funding for the program, amounting to nearly 60 percent of the 
total expenditures on the program throughout the entire 1950s.36 However, as historian Dee Gar-
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rison has pointed out, the vitality of Kennedy‘s program lasted less than a year. 37 Like the media 
campaign efforts of the OCDM, civil defense maintained a public marketing strategy at least into 
the mid 1960s. It was during the early 1960s that fallout shelters really became more prevalent in 
popular media as well. In 1961, President Kennedy addressed the nation amidst the Berlin Crisis 
by calling on Americans to protect themselves through home fallout shelters. This resulted in an 
intense public request for additional information on shelters. Soon Life magazine released an is-
sue including Kennedy‘s exhortation to build shelters. The issue then illustrated some prototype 
shelter plans and claimed that ―97 out of 100 people can be saved‖ if their homes were pre-
pared.38 According to Kenneth Rose, ―Shelters very quickly produced their own fallout, attract-
ing a torrent of criticism and making them popular objects of vilification.‖39In September of 
1962, The Twilight Zone aired an episode titled ―The Shelter.‖40 The episode revolved around 
what was then being termed ―shelter morality‖ or the moral dilemma of owning a shelter. In this 
particular episode one civil defense minded neighbor hosts a birthday party, but the party is dis-
rupted by a CONELRAD warning.41 Immediately, the party‘s host (the only person in the neigh-
borhood with a shelter) kicks his friends out of his home and locks his family in the basement 
shelter. After his neighbors desperately return, the host refuses to allow them into his shelter be-
cause of the insufficiency of supplies. The neighbors break their way into the shelter only to hear 
the radio announcement that the aforementioned alert was a false alarm. With that, the viewers 
were left to consider just how far they would be willing to go to protect themselves during a nuc-
lear war. Writing of this episode and other popular cultural anti-shelter productions during this 
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period, Kenneth Rose explains that, ―Proponents of an American fallout shelter system were 
never able to gain the moral high ground or capture the sympathies of the American public. To a 
great extent shelterists lost the political war because they lost the metaphorical war.‖42  
Even prior to these criticisms, popular fiction had been addressing the dilemmas of nuc-
lear war and civil defense efforts. Three particular novels that poignantly addressed these issues 
were Neville Shute‘s On the Beach, Mordecai Roshwald‘s Level 7, and Pat Frank‘s Alas, Baby-
lon! Each of these works contained explicit criticisms of nuclear warfare, the arms race, and civil 
defense programs. Chapter 3 will take a further look into how these novels each engaged with 
these ideas. 
By the mid 1960s, civil defense strategies were becoming increasingly outdated and un-
believable. As technological innovations increased the power and speed of nuclear warheads and 
their delivery systems, civil defense found itself facing extinction. These trends were easily 
gleaned by the public. As Tracy Davis points out, fallout shelters in the 1950s were to be stocked 
with one week of supplies, by the 1960s it was two weeks, and by the 1980s at least three 
weeks.43 There was also what Paul Boyer calls ―the Big Sleep‖ concerning nuclear fears span-
ning from the mid 1960s until the early 1980s. During this period, civil defense agencies across 
the world began focusing more on environmental disasters and less on manmade ones. This hap-
pened in the U.S., as well as in Australia, Canada, and the UK. While the 1980s saw a brief re-
vival of civil defense rhetoric, the notion of home fallout shelters and mass evacuations had run 
its course by the late 1960s. Throughout its existence however, civil defense was founded upon 
and influential in a variety of rationales.  
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2.4 Rationales 
Although national security was the primary rationale underlying civil defense, the various 
programs also illuminate how foreign policy, nuclear strategy, and domestic concerns were ad-
dressed. In some ways, civil defense offers a window into each of these somewhat disconnected 
areas. In writing about the British civil defense programs, Matthew Grant has explained that, ―it 
allows us to penetrate Whitehall thinking about nuclear war, what a post-attack Britain would 
look like, and what measures could be implemented to alleviate the effects of such an attack.‖ 44 
Sociologist Guy Oakes has been particularly influential in tying civil defense to the national se-
curity policy of deterrence. According to Oakes, ―The instrument chosen to convince the Amer i-
can people to pay the price for the failure of deterrence was civil defense.‖45 In other words, only 
if Americans believed that survival was possible, could they support a nuclear arms race and 
tough policy stances towards the Soviet Union. Civil defense reveals much more about American 
political policy than one might expect.  
2.5 Nuclear Strategy 
Civil defense was inherently bound up with nuclear strategy throughout the Cold War. 
One of the most outspoken proponents of a functioning federal civil defense program was nuc-
lear strategist Herman Kahn. An incredibly controversial figure, Kahn was said to have been the 
model for Dr. Strangelove, from the famous Stanley Kubrick film of the same title. 46 In 1960, 
Kahn published his work On Thermonuclear War, a book dedicated to peeping into the horrors 
of nuclear war and finding ways to prepare for it. Kahn viewed civil defense as particularly im-
portant for U.S. deterrence policy. Accordingly, Kahn and other nuclear strategists designated 
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three various types of nuclear deterrence. What Kahn labeled Type I and Type II deterrence were 
most directly linked to the importance of possessing a strong national civil defense program. 
Type I deterrence, or ―passive deterrence‖ was the notion that the U.S. would guarantee a coun-
terattack if it were harmed. Type II deterrence, or ―active deterrence‖ is essentially the same 
concept as ―nuclear blackmail,‖ or the use of threats to deter an opponent from an aggressive 
act.47 Military planners believed that for either of these two strategies to work, there must be an 
efficient civil defense system intact.  
 In the Type I scenario, the U.S. policymakers would have to be kept safe from harm so 
that a counterattack could be managed. This was often referred to in civil defense pamphlets and 
literature as ―continuity of government‖ plans. Building deep blast and fallout shelters for the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of government were fundamental to this. In 1962, what be-
came known as the Greenbrier Bunker was built underneath the Greenbrier Hotel in West Vir-
ginia. This was to be the congressional bunker for the survivors of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives and Senate.48 The Executive branch was also provided a blast shelter, first at Raven Rock 
bunker in Pennsylvania (1950), and later High Point bunker in Mt. Weather Virginia (1958).49 
Although these bunkers were classified until the 1990s, it was common public knowledge that 
they existed. The concept was a simple one; for a Type I deterrence counterattack to occur, those 
able to launch such an attack must survive. These tactical designations of who was considered 
most important were a cause of much contention however. As will be discussed in chapter 3, this 
was a major point of concern and discontent toward civil defense planning that was addressed in 
the novel Level 7.  
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Type II deterrence also needed a strong civil defense program to be effective. In this sce-
nario, the public would need to be convinced of their safety if a tense political struggle were to 
erupt. If U.S. policymakers hoped to use nuclear weapons to deter another nuclear power hold-
er‘s actions, then Americans would only support such aggression if they could be convinced that 
their personal safety wasn‘t on the line. These arguments became even more complex through 
the concept of ―counterforce.‖50 
According to nuclear strategists, counterforce was the scenario where policymakers 
would choose to aim all of its nuclear weapons at an opponent‘s weapon sites. During the early 
Cold War years, this would have been a strategy of hitting Strategic Air Command bases in order 
to weaken the opponent‘s expected counterattack. Later on, it would entail being able to destroy 
an opponent‘s missile sites. This however became increasingly complicated as nuclear delivery 
systems expanded and diversified into ―the three S‘s,‖ or Strategic Air Command, submarines, 
and silos. According to Kahn, this would be the most logical use of nuclear weapons as opposed 
to ―countervalue,‖ which meant targeting ones weapons at civilian populations in an attempt to 
break a nation‘s manpower and psychological will to survive. 51 According to this logic, Kahn 
and others believed that civil defense made sense. If, for example the Soviets initiated a first 
strike against the U.S.‘s military targets, then civilians would mostly be residing in areas some 
distance away from such sites. If this were the case, then simple fallout shelters with enough 
supplies could theoretically allow these people to escape the radiation from such an attack. In the 
later 1960s, after civil defense had become increasingly delegitimized by popular opinion, politi-
cal elites such as Secretary of State Robert McNamara would try to revamp the programs in o r-
der to support the building of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) sites. Ironically, civil defense both 
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bolstered and harmed McNamara‘s efforts. By refusing to support civil defense, the federal go v-
ernment looked toward other methods for providing nuclear protection such as ABMs. On the 
other hand, these ABM sites tended to support ―counterforce‖ logic and could be much more ef-
ficient with an active civil defense program in case of an enemy‘s first strike. 52 It is no surprise 
however, that pacifists and others who had been aware of the twentieth century‘s wars doubted 
this theory. Throughout the twentieth century, civilians had increasingly become targeted by mil-
itary weapons.53 This was a point that was made by many who had opposed civil defense prepa-
rations, who argued that by building fallout shelters in one‘s home, civilians were being asked to 
increasingly blur the line between civilian and soldier.  
2.6 Foreign Policy 
Civil defense was tied to the U.S. policy of containment abroad. As Odd Arne Westad‘s 
Global Cold War points out, both the U.S. and Soviet Union viewed themselves as models of 
modernity. In describing their Cold War interventionism he wrote, ―Locked in conflict over the 
very concept of European modernity – to which both states regarded themselves as successors – 
Washington and Moscow needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicabili-
ty of their ideologies, the elites of the newly independent states proved fertile ground for their 
competition.‖54 While some might consider the superpower standoff between the U.S. and Soviet 
Union to have been ―cold,‖ these ideologies were played out in very ―hot‖ wars throughout the 
globe. According to Westad, the policy of containment was one of intervention that was justified 
by U.S. policymakers, ―everywhere, where Communism could be construed as a threat.‖55 
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Civil defense was particularly tied to containment through the concept of ―nuclear 
blackmail.‖ Nuclear blackmail is a scenario where one nuclear power holder uses its capabilities 
to threaten another nation if it refuses to cooperate. Within the policy of containment, this strate-
gy could be used to keep the U.S. from intervening into an area or newly independent communist 
leaning nation. The concept of nuclear blackmail was consistently named as a major rationale for 
civil defense throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. 56 It was believed by policymakers and 
nuclear strategists that if the U.S. could convince the Soviets that it had a functional and efficient 
defense against nuclear weapons, then it could also unilaterally intervene in developing coun-
tries. Also, if the Soviets decided to intervene in a nation and the U.S. wanted to check their in-
volvement, nuclear blackmail could provide a useful tool, but only if the Soviets could be co n-
vinced that the U.S. had an efficient defense system. Due to this possibility, civil defense was 
viewed by some as a threat to the United Nations and multilateral agreements. In a sense, civil 
defense not only needed to convince the American public of its effectiveness, but also the Soviet 
Union. Civil defense was not only operating as a façade to bolster foreign policies, but also do-
mestic ones. 
2.7 Domestic Policy 
According to sociologist Guy Oakes, civil defense was used to convince Americans that 
that nuclear war was not to be feared, because if people believed they could protect themselves, 
they were more likely to buy into deterrence theory.57 In this way, civil defense acted as a façade 
in order to accomplish what Oakes terms an ―emotional management‖ of the public. 58 In order 
for Americans to support deterrence theory and the nuclear arms race, the public would need to 
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believe that survivability was possible. Many influential policymakers viewed the public as weak 
minded, apathetic, and soft. Also, during the early Cold War years, it was believed that a nuclear 
war would have a stronger psychological impact than material one. It was vital to maintain a 
sense of calm then if the U.S. were ever attacked. Many policymakers hoped that civil defense 
could take the edge off of this terror. As many historians of civil defense have pointed out, early 
civil defense programs were largely based on the what has been called ―the Bible of civil d e-
fense,‖ or Project East River.59 The findings of this government funded project held that Ameri-
cans needed to be emotionally managed and strengthened in order to survive a nuclear attack. 
The board urged that civil defense was the tool by which this could be accomplished. If Amer i-
cans could be convinced that nuclear war was real and horrific, this was a first step towards 
building a more resilient and hardened society. This mentality was not only expressed through 
civil defense publications and materials, but even within popular fiction. This is particularly the 
case with Philip Wylie‘s 1954 novel Tomorrow! discussed in chapter 2 and Pat Frank‘s Alas, 
Babylon! in chapter 3. Many people however began to recognize the psychological rationale of 
civil defense and opposed the program for what they viewed as a ―conditioning‖ of Americans 
toward an acceptance of war.60 In an unusual way, both proponents and opponents of civil de-
fense could agree that the program was tantamount toward emotionally managing the American 
public, but disagreed on whether it should be done. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Civil defense held various meanings for different people. For some nuclear strategists, 
civil defense was a practical means to assure the physical survival of civilians living in cities dur-
ing a counterforce style attack. If such an attack should occur, everyday people could remain 
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alive and healthy if only they had fallout shelters. For other strategists and for many policymak-
ers, civil defense provided a façade that would encourage Americans to support a strong dete r-
rence policy, containment, and the nuclear arms race. Many policymakers also believed civil de-
fense provided the emotional management necessary to ensure that the American public was ba t-
tle hardened and prepared to face the psychological impacts of a horrific nuclear war. Whether it 
was considered a physical protection or a mere amulet that could ward off nuclear fears, civil 
defense was supported by a wide range of Cold War policymakers. These policies were imple-
mented primarily in three areas: industry, agriculture, and the suburbs. While some nuclear stra-
tegists believed urbanites could be saved, civil defense programs generally demarcated these 
areas as hopeless. Civil defense agencies such as the FCDA and later the OCDM became riddled 
with questions by the American public, especially during times of international crisis. These 
agencies eventually began to solidify their answers to the skeptical and reluctant public. As tech-
nological innovations such as thermonuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles in-
creasingly became public knowledge, opposition towards civil defense policies also increased. 
Amidst this expansion of information into the public sphere, civil defense agencies made a sig-
nificant push towards creating a favorable media campaign. Understanding the reactions toward 
this campaign through local and national print media illuminates just how rampant these crit i-
cisms truly were.  
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3 “CONDITION YELLOW”: THE REGULATION OF INFORMATION IN CIVIL    
DEFENSE DISCOURSE 
―Chuck recognized him, though he was ash-pale, almost blue- lipped and his features 
were screwed up with the torture of his fears and his determination. It was River City‘s Mayor 
Clyde. ‗I repeat, General,‘ he said almost in a shout, ‗if we are not yet threatened, we must main-
tain Condition Yellow! You start those sirens and you sign the death warrant of maybe a tho u-
sand people. Great God! The whole population and the county around is jammed downtown and 
they‘d panic!‘‖ – Tomorrow!61 
 
Throughout most of the early Cold War period, a succession of U.S. civil defense pro-
grams struggled to convince Americans of their viability and effectiveness in offering protection 
against nuclear weapons. These federal agencies soon recognized that a balance of information 
must be presented to the public, a sort of ―condition yellow,‖ or a state of equilibrium in which 
people were concerned, but not debilitated by the implications of supporting civil defense. If e i-
ther too much or too little information about the effects of nuclear weapons was given, the public 
would continue to disregard their future wartime roles. It was believed that both under- informed 
and over-informed civilians were at the root of a public paralysis regarding civil defense policies. 
In response to this inaction, the federal government established a new civil defense agency titled 
the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in 1958 that hoped to mobilize these unresponsive 
citizens through a media campaign. Well respected and popular writer Philip Wylie encouraged 
higher participation in civil defense procedures through his writings, including his novel Tomor-
row! and several magazine and journal articles. Despite putative support on Democratic and Re-
publican Party platforms, the OCDM‘s attempts immediately became a site of contestation from 
the political Right and Left. Also during this period, Wylie reversed his support for nuclear pro-
tection and began openly questioning civil defense policies. An analysis of popular print media 
discourses responding to the OCDM‘s media campaign and Wylie‘s transformation uncovers a 
                                                                 
61
 Philip Wylie, Tomorrow! (Bison Books, 2009), 232. 
33 
significantly different perspective to the traditional historiography‘s focus on the 1950s conse n-
sus towards Cold War foreign and military policies. While much attention has been placed on 
institutional histories of civil defense, print media responses regarding civil defense policies 
demonstrate the potency that public disillusionment wielded on federal policies.  
3.1 Civil Defense: A Mercurial Past 
The Soviet acquisition of an atomic bomb in 1949 prompted the United States govern-
ment to strengthen its WWII civil defense program.62 While WWII civil defense policies focused 
on blackouts and air patrols, nuclear weapons rendered these policies less relevant. It is in this 
fashion that civil defense programs continually struggled to exist, mistakenly embracing yester-
day‘s defenses for tomorrow‘s weaponry. The first significant postwar program was embodied in 
the Federal Civil Defense Administration . This organization, however, was plagued by debates 
about how civilians should protect themselves. Should, in the event of a nuclear war, civilians 
evacuate cities, duck and cover, or build home fallout shelters? Unfortunately, the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration oscillated between each of these options, which resulted in a confused 
public.63 As one op-ed explained, civil defense was receiving a poor response because in the past 
there ―was confusion among the experts and government leaders…. Policies and projects were 
shifted repeatedly and many of them seemingly didn‘t make much sense.‖ By late 1959 however, 
the writer opined that the, ―Differences and conflicts among various agencies holding some re-
sponsibility for civil defense seem largely to have been ironed out.‖64  
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3.2 The National Shelter Policy and the OCDM 
Recognizing these problems in 1958, President Eisenhower approved the National Shel-
ter Policy.65 This policy prioritized the building of private or home fallout shelters over a full 
evacuation (See figure 3.1). To advance the National Shelter Policy, the OCDM replaced the 
FCDA. Its central responsibility was to orchestrate a national media campaign to inculcate public 
participation in the building of home fallout shelters.  In 1959, the Director of the OCDM, Leo 
A. Hoegh, asked the readers of The Washington Evening Star, ―Have you been hearing more 
about civil defense lately? It‘s no accident…. We planned it that way.‖66 The OCDM was forti-
fied by other allies also. Placing civil defense into the national limelight, New York Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller proposed of a bill that mandated every homeowner in New York to build a 
private fallout shelter.67 Like the National Shelter Policy, Rockefeller‘s plan was viewed by 
some as an answer to ―civil defense‘s chronic black eye‖ of indecisiveness. 68 As will be demon-
strated however, Rockefeller‘s shelter bill functioned as a lightning rod for national opposition 
towards civil defense. Although deployed earlier than the OCDM or Nelson Rockefeller‘s bill, a 
third component in the push for civil defense education was popular writer Philip Wylie‘s book 
Tomorrow!. All three advocated civil defense as a viable and necessary component of national 
security and personal survival.
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Figure 3 - A model fallout shelter displaying two weeks‘ worth of supplies (circa 1957). Courtesy of the National Archives, 
Photo No. 311-D-15(7) 
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Because the OCDM was viewed by many as the first focused civil defense program offe r-
ing a coherent plan for action, it provides an excellent case for understanding the public‘s  
response to it.69 Since the OCDM engaged in a media campaign that used local, regional, and 
national print media, its discourse offers a unique window into how everyday Americans per-
ceived civil defense. Newspapers around the country, both large and small, printed op-eds sup-
porting the OCDM‘s National Shelter Policy and urging Americans to participate. The OCDM 
fostered this discourse with the American public. A list of these ―favorable‖ op-eds was pub-
lished annually by the agency, providing insight into the areas where discourse was inaugu-
rated.70  
3.3 The Ill-Informed Public and Psychological Hardening   
The OCDM believed that proper information distribution lie at the heart of the civil de-
fense dilemma. The term ―public apathy‖ was consistently invoked as an explanation for the tor-
pidity of the American citizenry regarding fallout shelters. Civil defense publications and Philip 
Wylie‘s popular novel Tomorrow! portrayed this inaction as rooted in public ignorance on the 
topic of nuclear survival. Speaking to the medical field in 1960 Gerhard Blieken, a member of 
the National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on Civil Defense gave an address titled 
―Apathy and Defense‖ that sought to understand the underlying causes associated with disen-
gaged Americans. Quoting from Oskar Morgenstern‘s book The Question of National Defense, 
he claimed that American insouciance was rooted in two causes: ―The first is the unbelievable 
complexity of the problems. The second is that the horrendous nature of the problems makes 
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them difficult of personal and public acceptance.‖71 Educating the public and the creation of 
honest, public dialogue could allay this fear. Bleicken theorized that much of the problem was 
caused by a ―superstitious fear of acknowledging the reality of the threat.‖72 Civil defense media 
provides a potent illustration of this concern. In one civil defense cartoon a medical patient is 
diagnosed with ―nuclearosis,‖ a disease whose symptoms included ―nuclear blindness, all he can 
see is a mushroom cloud, he is blinded from the fear of it, deaf from the sound of it.‖73  The pa-
tient‘s doctor explains the purpose of a fallout shelter and the man is miraculously cured. If the 
public could only be informed as to what this war would look like, and more importantly how to 
survive it, then their paralysis could be cured and they would begin preparing.  
The accusation of ―public apathy‖ was a staple of the OCDM‘s favorable op-eds and fre-
quently mentioned in writings by civil defense administrators both local and national. This was 
generally articulated through accusations of ―defeatism‖ and ―fatalism‖ towards the American 
public. In national and local newspapers, proponents of civil defense railed against the ‗apathetic 
public‘ for having a ―head in the sand attitude.‖74 In response to an earlier article criticizing the 
effectiveness of fallout shelters, Illinois Civil Defense Director Robert Woodward even claimed 
that ―The Russians have convinced many gullible people that nothing can be done under atomic 
bombing.‖75 In another case where an expert on school building construction testified that there 
was nothing schools could do to be protected from the enormous force of a hydrogen bomb The 
Nashville Tennessean explained that ―fatalism isn‘t the answer [,] for the more concerned people 
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become with nuclear peril the surer we will move toward solutions for survival.‖76 Front and 
center in educating the public against indifference was popular writer Philip Wylie.  
3.4 Philip Wylie 
Although a household name in the 1950s, Philip Wylie is now remembered mostly by 
science fiction buffs and feminists. Like many talented writers of the period, Wylie was interes t-
ed in a variety of topics and studies including psychology, science, and religion. In his New York 
Times obituary, he was described as a ―prolific iconoclast‖ who ―was very often ahead of his 
time in his thinking.‖77 As with many other science fiction writers he was enamored with the 
idea of harnessing the atom well before the feat was accomplished. After writing about the pos-
sibilities of a German acquisition of an atomic bomb in 1932, Wylie‘s article was censured and 
he was placed on house arrest.78 Even after the first use of atomic weapons in Japan Wylie wrote 
an article for Colliers praising the possibilities for the newly unleashed energy, while nonetheless 
calling for the nationalization of atomic energy and an internationalization of scientific know-
ledge.79 After a bitter disagreement with a professor at Princeton, Wylie discontinued his formal 
education.80 Nonetheless, Wylie‘s broad knowledge of atomic energy and weapons were em-
braced by the public. For this reason, his name was consistently listed as a contributor to the Bul-
letin of Atomic Scientists alongside Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and 
David Lilienthal. Because of this expertise, Wylie was asked to serve as a consultant for the Fed-
eral Civil Defense Administration in 1949. This was in part because of his incredible ability to 
convey complex topics to a general readership. One biographer explained that Wylie excelled at 
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―Taking difficult concepts and translating them into the language of everyman… alienat[ing] 
university pedants, but slowly gathered a following of Middle Americans.‖ 81 In 1954 Wylie fo-
cused his abilities toward teaching Americans about the importance of civil defense in his didac-
tic novel, Tomorrow! 
Dedicated to ―the gallant men and women of the Federal Civil Defense Administration 
and to those other true patriots, the volunteers, who are doing their best to save the sum of 
things,‖ Tomorrow! forced its readers to imagine the destructiveness of an all-out nuclear war.82 
Years later Wylie explained that his motivations for writing Tomorrow! emerged from his ―near 
despair at the apathy of the average citizen‖ to the threat of a nuclear attack.83  Tomorrow! cen-
ters around the fictional twin cities of Green Prairie and River City, separated by a river and state 
boundaries. While Green Prairie has a strong civil defense program, River City, like the readers 
Wylie hoped to reach, believed the entire concept farcical. This disdain swiftly changes when a 
Soviet attack on the entire United States occurs and the twin cities are among those targeted. 
Soon families are split, the unprepared are killed (either physically or psychologically) due to 
their neglect and complete mayhem ensues.  
The messages in Tomorrow! are presented with impressive clarity. Civil defense was not 
unequivocally going to save everyone physically, but it could certainly provide a psychological 
protection. In other words, civil defense could mentally prepare people to live through the reali-
ties of a nuclear war. To do this, they would need to repeatedly practice and imagine the horror 
of nuclear weapons so that they could become psychologically hardened. In the same way that 
blast shelters were to become ―hardened‖ against nuclear weapons, civil defense hoped to ―har-
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den‖ the public psyche through a consistent use of drills and operations. 84 This process was simi-
larly described by Gerhard Bleicken who claimed that, ―the situation here…is not dissimilar to 
that facing students in medical school the first time the class in anatomy enters the morgue. Little 
anatomy is studied until the students have become used to death.‖85 In the end, when cities were 
rebuilt and families reunited, this psychological protection would be a valuable resource. The 
dividing factor between survival and death, according to Tomorrow!, was the ability to be coura-
geous and calm in the face of danger. While fearful characters are trampled to death, courageous 
ones remain healthy and happy even after they have encountered high levels of radiation. 86 In 
this way, Wylie had entered into the debates over the importance of psychology in the role that 
civil defense was to play. In his own words, he ―felt certain that in any nuclear war the nation 
best ready to bear such horrific assault on its civilian front would win the war.‖87 
Certainly, Wylie was much more concerned about the under- informed public and be-
lieved that a realistic portrayal of nuclear war would help allay their concerns. In reality howe v-
er, Wylie portrayed a nuclear war far more gruesome than anything the OCDM was publishing. 
Tomorrow! describes children being sliced in half in their mother‘s arms, footless men running 
on their shins through the streets, and countless people being trampled to death during the attack. 
Even those fortunate enough to avoid physical harm, but unprepared mentally, suffered psycho-
logical impairment leaving them as good as deceased. The OCDM did not necessarily view these 
depictions as harmful towards their goals either. Tomorrow!‘s ability to describe in detail the 
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horrors of a nuclear war was praised by the director of the Federal Civil Defense Administration 
at the time. Director Val Peterson hailed Wylie‘s description of ―helpless, confused, panicky, 
badly informed people, whose ignorance leaves them completely unprepared for what befalls 
them.‖88 Wylie and the OCDM‘s educational discourse soon backfired, shifting the balance of 
fear towards those who claimed to understand the effects of nuclear weapons.  
3.5 The Over-Informed Public and Conventionalization 
Philip Wylie and the OCDM hoped that educating the public would serve as a catalyst for 
the building of fallout shelters within homes. But these preparations never occurred on any sig-
nificant scale in individual homes.89 On the contrary, it appears that as Americans became more 
informed about nuclear weapons, and specifically about their increasingly devastating effects, 
the less interested they were in civil defense. Like the General in Tommorow!, civil defense 
needed to cause alarm, or awaken the apathetic without over-informing the public. To do this, 
civil defense was forced to maintain a sort of ―condition yellow.‖ Failing to strike the correct 
balance would inevitably result in the destruction of lives and nations.  
While simultaneously educating the public on the heat, blast, and radiation produced 
through nuclear explosions, the OCDM purposefully downplayed the radioactive aspects of nuc-
lear weapons. To be fair to the OCDM, its publications consistently acknowledged that fallout 
shelters were not blast shelters. However, the OCDM and more specifically the National Shelter 
Policy undermined this by placing the focus on shelters over evacuation. In fact, the OCDM o f-
ten downplayed the possibility that cities would be targets claiming that, ―One thing is certain if 
this country is attacked with nuclear weapons our air and missile bases will be primary ta r-
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gets….‖90 Not only redirecting the focus from urban areas, the OCDM also consistently de-
emphasized nuclear fallout. As revealed by sociologist Guy Oakes, this was an attempt to con-
ventionalize the atomic bomb, a psychological tactic of downplaying nuclear weapons to make 
them seem like nothing more than larger conventional explosives. This was a staple of the offi-
cial civil defense discourse. In pursuing this tactic, the dangers of radioactive fallout was consis-
tently minimized. In a speech to physicians, longtime champion of civil defense, Edward Teller 
explained that the American public had been ―scared by words like fallout‖ which ―amounts to 
one or two per cent of the radiation that we get from natural sources, from cosmic rays, from ra-
dioactivity, in our blood from potassium, from radioactivity in our food or in our soil.‖91 Teller 
continued, ―About that one or two extra per cent, some fear-mongers will scare you. They will 
tell you we don‘t know its effects, therefore we should eliminate it. The effects are so small that 
we can‘t observe them. Shall we be afraid of everything that is so small that it has no noticeable 
effects?‖92 It was perceived that through this conventionalization, Americans could be psycho-
logically soothed even in the case of an actual attack. 93  In many ways, conventionalization ap-
pealed to civil defense as the ―condition yellow‖ needed to maintain the balance between healthy 
fear and uncontrollable panic. As implied by Teller‘s arguments, the authors of conventionaliza-
tion used technical arguments to ease psychological fears. However, technologically informed 
arguments also undercut this process. Philip Wylie‘s switch over civil defense provides a nice 
example of these powerful criticisms. 
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3.6 Technological Advances 
As science fiction historian and writer Sam Moscowitz explained ―Tomorrow! was out-
dated within six months of its publication in 1954; the development of fusion weaponry de-
stroyed its validity.‖94 As fission weapons based on highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
evolved into fusion weapons such as the Hydrogen bomb, the destructive effects of these wea-
pons were multiplied. Worse, within five years of Tomorrow!’s printing, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union had successfully tested and deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles or 
ICBMs. This dramatically truncated the amount of time from hours to minutes before an attack 
could be implemented. Some of this threat was real and some perceived. In retrospect, the late 
1950s fears about the Soviet acquisition of ICBMs never materialized into the ―missile gap‖ that 
was perceived to exist.95 Nevertheless, this was known by only a few people including President 
Eisenhower who had access to information being gathered by U2 spy planes over the Soviet Un-
ion. 96 While the threat of hoards of ICBMs was a myth, thermonuclear (or fusion based) war-
heads were not and when compared pound for pound with atomic fission weapons, they released 
three times the amount of energy.97 
3.7 Wylie’s Betrayal 
In the midst of the OCDM‘s media campaign and just six years after publishing Tomor-
row!, Philip Wylie broke with his earlier involvement in civil defense and published an article in 
The Rotarian titled, ―Why I Believe There Will be No All-Out War.‖98 Much had changed since 
Wylie had tried to convince Americans not to panic if confronted with a nuclear attack. By 1960 
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hydrogen bombs and missile technology had rendered civil defense publications and information 
even more obsolete than they had been throughout the 1950s. Wylie dissuaded that, ―no plan – 
whether of city evacuation, shelters, early-warning-radar lines, or anything else – would be of 
value‖ during a full scale nuclear attack.99 Relinquishing the prospect of convincing Americans 
that nuclear war would be survivable if only the public were psychologically hardened and pre-
pared, Wylie now charged the OCDM with avoiding four major factors in its program. First, an 
all out nuclear attack would likely be lengthened over time in order to render the suggested two 
weeks supplies insufficient. Second, firestorms such as those in WWII (only much larger) would 
surely erupt after an H-bomb attack, asphyxiating any shelter dwellers. Third, nearly everyone 
within miles of ground zero would be instantly blinded when they reflexively watched the fire-
ball of the explosion. And last, the ecological ramifications of an absolute conflict would make 
the earth ―a death chamber for man for decades.‖100 Once viewing mental preparedness as the 
key component of civil defense, Wylie now focused on technicalities of warfare. These crit i-
cisms reflected not only Philip Wylie‘s concerns over civil defense, but coincided with those 
voiced by critics throughout the country as demonstrated in local and national newspapers. Wy-
lie‘s popularity empowered his message. The OCDM took these criticisms seriously, as Wylie 
had only too recently been one of its most ardent supporters and even an advisor to the program.  
Just as local criticisms of the OCDM often resulted in rebuttals by local civil defense 
leaders, Wylie‘s attack against the program in The Rotarian resulted in a rebuttal from OCDM 
director Leo A. Hoegh. In his attempt to refute Wylie‘s article, Hoegh initially addressed Wylie‘s 
technical criticisms, highlighting the alterations in civil defense since Wylie had been involved 
with the program. According to Hoegh, the National Shelter Plan, NORAD‘s warning system, 
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and an abundance of stockpiled supplies across the nation, ―assures us that America cannot be 
destroyed even in the worst possible attack.‖101  Nevertheless, this vague description of trans-
formations in civil defense was not Hoegh‘s central focus. Heogh‘s rebuttal, titled ―Beware A 
Failure in Nerve,‖ claimed that Wylie had become a pusillanimous ―defeatist‖ since writing To-
morrow! 102 Ironically, like Wylie half a decade prior, he was more concerned over the psycho-
logical impacts of civil defense than its technicalities. Hoegh‘s rebuttal reveals that civil de-
fense‘s greatest rhetorical weaknesses were partially rooted in the neglect to addressing technol-
ogical aspects of nuclear conflict. Hoegh did not address any of Wylie‘s scientifically driven ar-
guments about the increased power of the hydrogen bomb, instead focusing on the ―will‖ of 
Americans and the importance of being psychologically prepared for war. Other than mentioning 
them in passing there was no clear explanation as to how the National Shelter Plan or NORAD‘s 
warning system would alleviate the problems of a full scale nuclear attack. 
After Hoegh‘s attempted rebuttal The Rotarian was filled with sympathetic responses to 
Wylie‘s article. One letter even recommended publishing the article throughout the World to in-
form readers of the ―hair raising‖ effects of fusion weapons. 103 Another explained that ―The 
American people may not have thought through this thing as clearly as Mr. Wylie has done, but 
they have reached the same conclusion, and have expressed it with their massive indifference to 
the whole idea of building little holes to hide in.‖104 The exchange between Wylie and Hoegh 
represents a much larger discussion being carried out across America in the late 1950s over the 
importance of psychological hardening and preparation. Their conversation demonstrates that 
there existed a concern over the supposedly apathetic mentality keeping Americans from adopt-
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ing the OCDM‘s recommendations. These arguments seemingly consisted of determining who 
the real defeatists were: those who built shelters or those who did not. These concerns were the 
grounds for much of the debate emerging throughout print media on local, regional, and national 
levels. A closer look into the responses to the OCDM‘s favorable op-eds reveals a nationwide 
disillusionment with civil defense.  
3.8 Popular Dissent: Contesting Civil Defense in Print Media 
Civil defense programs were supported throughout both Republican and Democratic Par-
ty platforms in 1956, 1960, and 1964. In 1956 the Democratic platform even attacked the Eise n-
hower administration‘s policies as obsolete when matched up to the advances in nuclear wea-
pons, claiming the Democratic Party would place more attention on the programs. This emphasis 
was significantly scaled down for the 1964 platforms. Despite the broad bipartisan support for 
civil defense, newspaper op-eds reveal that there was a significant amount of the population who 
did not support the ideas or discourse of civil defense. 105 
On the psychological question over civil defense, the Left perceived civil defense as a 
threat as it tended to condition Americans towards an acceptance of a nuclear war. It appears that 
these critics understood the psychological hardening purpose of civil defense with astounding 
perspicacity, placing them in near agreement with Wylie. What Wylie and the OCDM viewed as 
the cure to public insouciance, dissidents viewed as the symptom of the militarization of the pr i-
vate sphere. As Freda Sass of Massachusetts demurred, ―Until recently it has been bigger and 
better armaments that were supposed to keep us from being attacked. Now something new has 
been added – wholesale building of bomb shelters as a means of maintaining peace.‖106 Sass, 
among others, believed that fallout shelters were convincing Americans of the inevitability of an 
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austere war. This conditioning was largely associated with the coalescing roles of military and 
non-military actors during the Cold War. This erosion between civil and military lines was also 
acknowledged and sometimes embraced by civil defense advocates. 107As Gerhard Bleiken ex-
plained to the American Chemical Society, ―any real distinction between military and nonmilita-
ry defense is meaningless.‖108  
Soon civil defense discourse was co-opted by others who began linking it with foreign 
policy, urban renewal, and disarmament. In response to a pro-civil defense op-ed in The New 
York Post several letters to the editor criticized both the conditioning effec ts of civil defense as 
well as articulating disdain for the foreign policies the programs were based upon. Calling the 
push for home shelters ―frightening,‖ George Bernstein wrote, ―if put into effect it would lead 
people to assume that there is after all, some protection against atomic war. If they believe this, 
then presumably they will be even less concerned with preventing such a catastrophe.‖109 
Bernstein finally concluded that, ―If as much initiative, intelligence, time, and imagination were 
devoted by the average citizen to compelling a basic transformation in foreign policy, then we 
might not find ourselves in this grotesque cul-de-sac.‖110 If after all, every American could be 
convinced that shelters would provide protection, then nuclear war would be that much more ac-
ceptable. Other reactions that appeared in The Post demanded that the readers realize ―the crazy 
shelter plan,‖ demand peace through the United Nations, and demonstrate, ―that Uncle Sam is 
not a war-monger.‖111 Using civil defense as a platform for discussing nuclear armament was 
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also prevalent throughout this exchange.112 Jack Coolidge of Massachusetts chided civil defense 
as an unfruitful approach to more immediate policy concerns. Calling for disarmament, he e x-
plained that, ―if we expect to alleviate the threat of annihilation, then nuclear war should cease to 
be an instrument of our own national policy. In fact, I consider it much more vital than the ques-
tion of $200 bomb shelters that we strive to develop some policy more flexible, more hopeful, 
and less ruthless than ‗massive retaliation.‘‖113 Even concerns over urban development were dis-
cussed through civil defense. In reaction to Rockefeller‘s proposed mandatory shelter bill, 
Brooklyn resident Diana Guadagnino wrote a letter to the editor of The New York Times asking, 
―if the state government has the authority to compel citizens to build fall-out shelters, why is it 
not possible for our state and local government to compel landlords to provide decent hous-
ing?‖114 Guadagnino, along with a multitude of other critics, questioned government‘s authority 
to intervene into their private spheres for defense, yet neglect to regulate housing standards for 
tenants in the slums.  
Similar arguments also emerged from the Right.  Much of this commentary was focused 
on Rockefeller‘s shelter bill. These advances gained momentum despite Rockefeller‘s insistence 
that shelters would be subsidized by financial incentives, like ―property tax abatements, income 
tax deductions, low cost state loans, and other inducements.‖115 Resistance to the bill appeared in 
the conservative New York Daily News.  In an op-ed criticizing the Rockefeller bill titled, ―Fa l-
lout Crawl- ins for All?‖ the writer regarded shelter building as an acceptance of Soviet superiori-
ty in a psychological Cold War. Turning the OCDM‘s arguments on their head, this viewpoint 
                                                                 
112
 This was specifically manifest in large protests against civil defense by disarmament groups such as the 
Women Strike for Peace, Women‘s International League for Peace and Freedom, etc. These protests have been well 
documented and discussed by Dee Garrison. Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon. 
113
 ―No Hid ing Place,‖ The Berkshire Eagle, September 4, 1959, 16. 
114
 ―Housing, Not Shelters, Asked,‖ The New York Times, March 1, 1960, 32. 
115
 ―For New Yorkers: Compulsory Shelters,‖ Newsweek, July 20, 1959, 24. 
49 
held that Americans were accepting defeat if they built shelters. Unlike liberal opponents who 
viewed shelters as a conditioning agent, this writer viewed c ivil defense as a way of dismissing 
the effectiveness of deterrence based on offensive nuclear capabilities manifest through a supe-
rior position in the arms race. Using the same terminology that the OCDM used against oppo-
nents of civil defense, the op-ed claimed that the shelter bill ―smells of defeatism.‖116  Consi-
dered to be an attack on private property and individual freedom, many conservative critics 
viewed Rockefeller‘s plan as invasive. As the Daily News op-ed explained, Rockefeller‘s bill 
was ―like unto other well-meaning persons‘ efforts to terrorize people concerning cigarets [sic], 
liquor, and so on.‖117 Another critic of the Rockefeller bill humorously warned those who cons i-
dered building fallout shelters against such action as, ―New York City‘s building laws probably 
make such shelters illegal to use under any circumstances.‖118 Linking Rockefeller‘s mandatory 
shelter bill with the intense New York building codes reveals how civil defense discourse was 
often appropriated to voice larger concerns.  
Criticisms of civil defense from the Right were not only confined to attacks on Rockefe l-
ler‘s bill, but were often directed towards broader implications of civil defense policy. Accurate-
ly pointing out that fallout shelters would not protect from an atomic blast, several articles ac-
knowledged that ―humanitarian insurance‖ could not be guaranteed for owners of shelters.119 
Further, op-eds often invoked a religious argument claiming that, ―Every one of us is going to 
die when the Good Lord sends for him or her; not before, not after. Why then, fear atomic fal-
lout, or anything else? Why not… refuse to live in terror – which is akin to dying and takes a lot 
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longer?‖120 A similar sentiment was expressed in The New York Times when a writer lambasted 
that, ―Within my memory, individuals in some societies compelled a man about to be executed to 
dig his own grave. A refinement of this custom is the proposal by Governor Rockefeller to co m-
pel families to dig their own self-sealing, prefab tomb.‖121  Summing up many of the op-eds by 
conservative critics, one cartoon showed a silhouetted man and woman with the caption, ―To my 
mind, fear is just a lingering death, I‘ll meet death gaily - but not daily.‖122    
Many opposed civil defense simply because of its costliness. In describing the financial 
burdens of supporting civil defense, opponents often called the program a ―Maginot Line‖ de-
fense. One op-ed in Long Island‘s Newsday explained that, ―We do not think that the American 
people favor a ‗Maginot Line‘ philosophy, The Maginot Line having been a costly chain of forti-
fications supposed to keep the Nazis out of France but totally useless when the moment of attack 
came.‖123 The Maginot Line example was used to point to the financial mistakes of trying to 
create an expensive and stagnant defense against an evolving threat. According to this argument, 
the money could be better spent on the escalating arms race. As one writer‘s op-ed explained, 
―The answer is not to be found in a home-made Maginot Line. The bombs get bigger every year. 
The answer is to be found in a dual, nationwide program – First, speed up our ballistic missiles 
program to the maximum possible, so that we can at the earliest date match Russian production; 
second spend this proposed shelter money on guaranteeing world peace by guaranteeing the sta-
bility of our allies.‖124 From this viewpoint, civil defense was undermining the arms race and 
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more specifically the ―missile gap‖ that was then believed to be widening between the U.S. and 
Soviet‘s intercontinental ballistic missile programs.125 
3.9 Losing Ground: Civil Defense’s Steady Erosion 
Certainly by 1960, the OCDM‘s media campaign had failed to present itself as a viable 
option for national security. Nelson Rockefeller‘s mandatory shelter bill for New York had met 
intense criticism not only from New Yorkers, but from across the country. Rockefeller soon ac-
knowledged that his program ―would not receive whole-hearted public support‖ and backed 
off.126 Remaining a stalwart however, Rockefeller later used civil defense to challenge Kenne-
dy‘s policies on nuclear planning. Accordingly, Kennedy who was already a longtime advocate 
of civil defense responded by reinvigorating the program in the successor agency of the OCDM, 
the Office of Civil Defense. According to Dee Garrison, Kennedy large ly used this program to 
defend himself against Rockefeller who was expected to be the 1964 Republican challenger to 
the presidency. Announced in May, the Office of Civil Defense was ephemeral, lasting in name 
only after December the same year.127 The OCDM‘s director Hoegh soon vanished from the pub-
lic stage as well. By late 1960, Hoegh had offered his resignation to President Eisenhower. 128 
Despite contrary reports, Heogh insisted that fallout shelters were being built throughout the 
country. After resigning from the OCDM, he re-focused his efforts towards civil defense within 
the private sector by starting the Wonder Building Corporation, a company that sold prefabr i-
cated fallout shelters.129 Neither Rockefeller or Hoegh lost interest in civil defense, instead redi-
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recting their efforts elsewhere. In a sense, the OCDM was successful in creating public discourse 
on civil defense, but failed in its ability to contain it.  
3.10 Conclusion: Immobilizing  
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the federal government believed that civil defense 
could provide valuable resources to maintain stability within the country in the horrific occur-
rence of a nuclear attack. Its value could be found in its ability to provide both psychological and 
physical protection to one of the most valuable resources the nation‘s recuperation relied upon, 
human labor. Despite the OCDM‘s best attempts toward educating Americans into an active role 
in protecting themselves, this education often backfired by providing Americans with additional 
information about the horrors of nuclear weapons. Philip Wylie also hoped that by guiding his 
readers through the visual realities of nuclear war, he could stir their interest in protecting the m-
selves from an inevitable Soviet attack. In attempts to educate the apathetic, Wylie and the 
OCDM generally stressed the psychological promises held by civil defense preparation, that it 
would provide psychological hardening so that one could remain panic free in an actual crisis. 
On the other hand, in order to rein in the over- informed opponents of the program, Edward Teller 
and the OCDM engaged in arguments about the scientific aspects of nuclear weapons. This was 
most effectively pursued through the conventionalization of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding, 
conventionalization arguments proved much more difficult as technological advances were made 
throughout the early Cold War period. The shifts from aerial bombs to land based missiles and 
from fission to fusion chain reactions largely eroded the discourses concerning conventional 
weaponry.  Ironically, it was through novels such as Tomorrow! and civil defense educational 
publications that many readers gradually became less interested in designating themselves as 
soldiers in a future war. Americans, both conservative and liberal, not only maintained their inert 
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positions toward building shelters, but soon began appropriating the language of civil defense to 
criticize a plethora of military, foreign, fiscal, and domestic policies. Eventually, protest against 
civil defense drills resulted in the beginnings of a more encompassing anti-nuclear movement. 
As Dee Garrison points out, civil defense protests successfully transitioned into anti-nuclear pro-
tests over the course of the 1960s and 1970s.130  
An analysis of popular print media sources including newspapers, magazines, and jour-
nals reflects the broad immobilization against civil defense policies after government discourses 
failed to successfully regulate the information available to its citizenry. Articulated in a variety 
of ways, critics of civil defense arose from a wide spectrum of the American public. As histo-
rians have increasingly noted, the 1950s might better be understood as a period of liberalizing 
values and not as an era of stagnant political consensus.131 An in depth analysis and review of 
popular print media discourse emerging from the debates around civil defense certainly substan-
tiate this trend. It is not coincidental that as civil defense programs lost popular public support, 
they transitioned towards concerns over natural disasters instead. 132 This trend largely reflects 
the demands of those opposed to civil defense programs. Just as Wylie‘s Rotarian article ex-
pressed concern over the environmental degradation of a nuclear war, anti-nuclear groups also 
fixated on environmental damage being done by nuclear testing. In response to the Atmospheric 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 anti-nuclear groups shifted their focus.133 Just as many oppo-
nents of civil defense ―immobilized‖ against the OCDM‘s admonishment for building shelters, 
so did they eventually mobilize against the environmental impacts of nuclear power. The story of 
                                                                 
130
 Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon, 10. 
131
 Alan Petigny, The Permissive Society: America, 1941-1965, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
132
 This trend occurred on a global scale. Civil defence in the UK, Australia, and Canada also refocused 
their efforts towards recuperation after natural disasters. The simultaneous occurrence of this within the U.S., U.K., 
and Canada is noted in Tracy Davis‘s Stages of Emergency. Davis, Stages of Emergency. 
133
 Lawrence S. W ittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Move-
ment, 1971-Present, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 2003), 21.  
54 
the OCDM provides a salient example of how political institutions and organizations may occa-
sionally be molded and reshaped in accordance with popular opinions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
4 THE DIDACTIC ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR APOCALYPTIC IN SCIENCE FICTION 
―Survival after World War III has been the subject of enough fiction to stock a sizable 
fallout shelter.‖134 Ward Moore, Author of Greener Than You Think 
 
―Make a list of the ‗science fiction‘ books which have won wide acceptance in recent 
years, and you will find they have one thing in common: they are parables, warning of political 
or military disaster. The remoteness of imagined worlds is what charms a science-fantasy reader: 
the immediacy of these books is what sells them to the public.‖135 Damon Knight  
 
 
Just as Philip Wylie used popular fiction to disseminate his pro-civil defense message in 
Tomorrow!, he and many others later used nuclear apocalyptic fiction to criticize civil defense 
efforts and its ideological foundations. After his damning 1960 criticism published in The Rota-
rian, Wylie would go on to publish yet another nuclear fiction titled Triumph in 1963. Like To-
morrow!, Wylie painted a grim and disturbing portrait of nuclear warfare. However, whereas 
Tomorrow! offered readers a sense of hope through civil defense, Triumph is void of nearly any 
positive message about nuclear survival. Many other novels during the period both implicitly and 
explicitly dealt with civil defense. As noted in Chapter 2, the reign of the Office of Civil and De-
fense Mobilization and its concomitant media campaign witnessed an increased public backlash 
against civil defense and particularly fallout shelters. This backlash was not confined to newsp a-
pers and magazines but was also present within popular fiction. Notable examples of this include 
Neville Shute‘s On the Beach (1957), Pat Frank‘s Alas, Babylon (1959), Mordecai Roshwald‘s 
Level 7 (1959), and Philip Wylie‘s aforementioned Triumph (1963).136  Each of these writers 
used popular science fiction to voice criticisms of civil defense and its underpinning rationales of 
national security, nuclear strategy, and foreign and domestic policies.  
                                                                 
134
 Ward Moore, The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction , September, 1963, 93. 
135
 Damon Knight, ―Level 7,‖ The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction, July 1960, 78. 
136
 Nevil Shute, On the Beach, (Ballantine Books, 1983); Pat Frank, Alas, Babylon, 1st Perennial Classics 
ed. (Harper Perennial, 1999); Mordecai Roshwald, Level 7, ed. David Seed, 1st ed. (University of Wisconsin Press, 
2004); Philip Wylie, Triumph (Bison Books, 2007). 
56 
4.1 On the Beach (1957) 
Although it was written prior to the OCDM‘s media campaign, Neville Shute‘s On the 
Beach was one of the most influential nuclear apocalyptic fictions ever written. It was not only a 
bestselling novel in 1957, but was also made into a major film just two years later. According to 
Kenneth Rose, ―Of the countless science fiction pieces produced during this era that addressed 
nuclear holocaust, clearly the one that had the greatest impact on the public was Neville Shute‘s 
On the Beach....‖137 The book was perceived to be so influential on public opinion, that a swath 
of policymakers and civil defense administrators had to address its message.   
The majority of On the Beach takes place in two settings: inside a U.S. nuclear powered 
and equipped submarine and in Australia. A nuclear war was spurred by a minor incident in the 
Balkans that escalates into a full blown nuclear holocaust. Due to the powerful new develop-
ments in nuclear weapons, this war is over in a matter of 37 days. 138 Unlike Wylie‘s Tomorrow! 
the intimate horrors of nuclear warfare are left out and the novel takes place after the initial nuc-
lear strikes. Because of the timing of this book, several key components of a nuclear explosion 
have been left out. According to nuclear physicists, a typical nuclear explosion will release four 
major forms of energy; initial nuclear radiation (gamma rays make up much of this), blast and 
shock, thermal radiation (heat), and residual nuclear radiation (commonly known as fallout). 139 
On the Beach, like many of its readers during the late 1950s was more concerned with fallout 
than with any of the other elements. This particular phenomenon is what historian Paul Boyer 
has termed ―the fallout scare.‖140 Largely a reaction to the disastrous results of the 1954 Castle 
Bravo testing in the Pacific, nuclear fallout soon became a leading concern for the public. Why 
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then were so many people concerned about this if, as some nuclear scientists claimed, fallout o n-
ly represented about 5 percent of the energy released by a nuclear explosion? One reason might 
very well be that the other three elements (initial radiation, blast, and heat) of an explosion were 
likely to instantly kill anyone exposed. Another reason for this concern was the slippery nature of 
radiation poisoning caused by fallout. As one writer in The Saturday Evening Post expressed, it 
was truly ―the silent killer.‖141 This particular element of nuclear weapons was horrifying be-
cause according to many civil defense publications, you could neither see it, taste it, nor smell it. 
Also, deaths resulting from fallout or radiation poisoning would likely be painfully longer and 
more agonizing. Due to these factors, On the Beach paints a rather horrifying picture for its read-
ers. As one of its reviewers warned that, ―Even hardened veterans of countless fictional Arma-
geddons will find this an emotional wallop. It should be made mandatory reading for all profes-
sional diplomats and politicos.‖142 
In the novel, Australia is the last country to survive the nuclear war. The entire globe 
North and West of it has been encompassed by nuclear fallout making the Australians and one 
remaining U.S. submarine crew the last inhabitants of the Earth. Because the Australian Navy 
believes it is receiving some sort of garbled radio communication from Alaska, they decide to 
send the U.S. submarine to locate and determine the possibility of life and therefore an inhabita-
ble location North of them. This mission is vital because the fallout that has killed everyone else 
is slowly creeping towards the Australian continent. If survivors exist in the Northern Hemis-
phere, then some Australians might be able to escape to safety. Unfortunately, the U.S. crew is 
able to determine that the messages have been sent by an overturned Coke bottle teetering in the 
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wind onto the keys of a radio transmitter.143 Once the crew returns to Australia, reports of radia-
tion sickness have crept into the Northern areas of the country. Probably one of the most harro w-
ing and depressing bestsellers ever written, the book concludes with the deaths of everyone. Od-
dly, the Australian government concocts ―suicide pills‖ that many people take prior to dying 
from the radiation poisoning. This message, that it was better to commit suicide than to die of 
radiation poisoning was particularly disconcerting for civil defense officials who read the book.  
Unlike most depictions of nuclear war (particularly Tomorrow! and Alas, Babylon), 
Shute‘s characters and civilization as a whole remains unbelievably calm as they approach their 
imminent deaths. Submarine Commander Dwight Towers even goes so far as to purchase toys 
for his deceased American children and wife. Up until the last few days, the Australians continue 
to work at their places of employment and goods continue to be stocked and sold from shelves as 
if nothing has happened. This aspect of On the Beach was probably particularly harrowing for 
civil defense administrators who believed the program‘s most important work was to create a 
psychologically hardened public. Despite the surreal calmness that the people in On the Beach 
show in the face of nuclear catastrophe they die anyway. Unlike the numerous deaths in Wylie‘s 
Tomorrow! caused by trampling and panic, those in On the Beach are a result of a very real and 
unavoidable physically external element or by those who have thoughtfully calculated their op-
tions and have chosen to commit suicide. This of course was incredibly antithetical with the civil 
defense message that if you are able to stay calm and underground for two weeks, then you 
would likely be among the many to survive.  
The reaction to both the novel and film On the Beach from public policymakers and civil 
defense administrators was widespread. Much like the Wylie article in The Rotarian earlier, 
OCDM director Leo Hoegh personally responded within the public sphere in order to quell con-
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cerns.144 Civil defense publications also responded to the threat of Shute‘s novel. The American 
Medical Association‘s Civil Defense Review, quoted one civil defense administrator‘s response 
that,  
With proper measures, prepared in advance, and a properly indoctrinated public, we 
would not all be left ‗On the Beach,‘ despite the grim prediction of the moving picture by 
that name which is having such a great success. Indeed the movie is considered by many 
the wrong kind of dish. It merely encourages the feeling that ‗scare-em-to death‘ is the 
only policy to follow and, if that should fail, ‗Oh why think about it.‘145 
 
The sentiment expressed in this quote was one felt by many civil defense administrators 
around the country as they tried to counter the doom and gloom messages of On the Beach. The 
message of On the Beach (both the novel and film) was incredibly bothersome to those who sup-
ported civil defense efforts. For example one op-ed in The New York Daily News described the 
film as, ―defeatist‖ and claimed that it ―plays right up the alley of (a) the Kremlin and (b) the 
Western defeatists and/or traitors who yelp for the scrapping of the H-bomb.‖146 Considered a 
treasonous message by some, it was particularly considered dangerous not just as a criticism of 
civil defense but for its message of disarmament. This message was certainly not lost on nuclear 
scientist, civil defense proponent, and ―father of the H-bomb‖ Edward Teller. In speaking to a 
conference sponsored by the Council on National Security and the American Medical Associa-
tion in 1960 Teller gave On the Beach a significant amount of attention. Speaking to a group of 
doctors on ―The Physician‘s Role in a Nuclear Disaster,‖ Teller admitted that On the Beach  
is very frightening, not because it predicts that the human race will be wiped out by the 
next war. It cannot be done…. What frightens me rather is the description of our state of 
society. If there is a disaster, what should we do? Let‘s throw up our hands, let‘s take sui-
cide pills, and let‘s die. Is that the solution? Ladies and gentlemen, a society where a 
book is written about his topic, where this book is a best-seller, where a movie is made 
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about this topic, where none of the reviewers point out that this is dangerous nonsense, 
and where this book and this movie are great successes, I say there is something wrong 
with the state of mental health of that society, that is what scares me. 147 
 
For Teller and others who believed that civil defense was a viable option, concerns were 
usually shifted away from the details of the programs and placed squarely on the shoulders of 
society‘s psychological state. Most of the talks given on civil defense and dealing with the mes-
sages in On the Beach were far more concerned with the suicide pill taking society than they 
were with the nuclear escalation that resulted in human annihilation. Ironically, while civil de-
fense administrators and policymakers had earlier held that a panicky society would be the larg-
est danger during a nuclear war, they now were claiming that a society who would rather take 
suicide pills than risk nuclear radiation was just as disconcerting. Clearly, the popularity of On 
the Beach was a piece of popular media that was considered anywhere from annoying to trea-
sonous.  
4.2 Alas, Babylon (1959) 
Just two years after On the Beach was published and the same year that it featured as a 
film, at least three more nuclear apocalyptic novels appeared in bookstores across the country. 
Nuclear warfare was certainly on the public mind during the year 1959. As noted earlier, fallout 
had become a particularly harrowing aspect of nuclear weapons. It was also during this time that 
the OCDM initiated a massive media campaign resulting in the publication of articles in newspa-
pers and magazine across the country in support of civil defense. New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller had just announced his bill that hoped to mandate fallout shelters within the homes 
of New Yorkers and the discovery of strontium 90 in milk had just surfaced. With all of these 
events, the publication of nuclear apocalyptic novels provided the public with a myriad of poss i-
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bilities for what the future of the world could look like after a nuclear disaster. Probably the most 
positive of these novels in regards to civil defense was Pat Frank‘s Alas, Babylon.  
Pat Frank was the pen name for Harry Hart Frank, born in 1907. Frank worked as a go v-
ernment consultant as well as a newspaper writer during most of his life. In 1959, he published 
what has become one of the most famous nuclear apocalyptics of the period, Alas, Babylon. Like 
Tomorrow! the book was also incredibly supportive of the general aims of civil defense during 
the time. Nonetheless, upon a close reading of the novel, there appear several instances when 
civil defense administrators are painted in a negative light. Overall however, the novel reinforced 
many of the implied messages coming from the OCDM and its campaign to convince Americans 
that nuclear war was survivable if individuals took the initiative in protecting themselves and 
their families. 
Alas, Babylon takes place in the early Cold War setting of a rural central Florida town 
named Fort Repose. The protagonist Randy Bragg is a liberal minded lawyer who stands out 
from most of the local residents of his community. Randy‘s brother Mark, who is a high ranking 
U.S. military officer, calls Randy to inform him that there is an imminent nuclear war ahead. Due 
to the circumstances, Randy allows his brother‘s wife and children to come live with him. As 
Mark predicted, a full scale nuclear attack is mounted against the U.S. and Randy becomes a sort 
of local hero for his ability to survive in the post nuclear conditions. Much like Tommorrow! 
written five years earlier, Mark Bragg blames the nation‘s impending destruction on U.S. poli-
cymakers for their effete approach towards nuclear weapons development. Mark even uses the 
term ―missile gap,‖ that was famously used by candidate John F. Kennedy during the 1960 pres-
idential election, to describe this perceived policy failure. According to Mark Bragg, the U.S. 
had failed to update its nuclear technology and had become far too reliant upon the Strategic Air 
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Command bombers. When Randy asks his brother if he believes the Soviets could get away with 
the attack, Mark replies, ―Three years ago they couldn‘t. Three years hence, when we have our 
own ICBM batteries emplaced, a big fleet of missile toting subs, and Nike-Zeus and some other 
stuff perfected, they couldn‘t. But right now we‘re in what we call ‗the gap.‘‖148 Frank, like 
many others believed that the U.S. had fallen behind in the arms race. Although this perception 
later proved to be false, many at the time held such views. Mark Bragg also believes that civil 
defense efforts are one of the best deterrents for avoiding a nuclear war. During their last conver-
sation together Mark tells Randy that, ―Personally, I think everybody ought to be digging or eva-
cuating right this minute. Maybe if the other side knew we were digging, if they knew that we 
knew, they wouldn‘t try to get away with it.‖149 While the narrative in Alas, Babylon overwhel-
mingly supports the message of survivalism and individual responsibility, it also attacks the ine f-
ficiency of civil defense as a program. 
Pat Frank, like Chet Holifield, Herman Kahn, and many other serious civil defense pro-
ponents did not believe that the government was doing enough in the way of nuclear protection. 
Throughout the events of Alas, Babylon, Frank‘s descriptions of civil defense administrators and 
decisions are negative. For example, during the same conversation between Mark and Randy 
Bragg mentioned above, Randy asks Mark if he could ―tip off‖ some of his friends and family 
about the impending attack. In reply, Mark states, ―I don‘t see any objection. It is something Civ-
il Defense should have done weeks – months ago.‖150 Fort Repose‘s local civil defense adminis-
trator, Mr. Offenhaus, is a depicted as a greedy opportunist who isn‘t willing to inform his area 
about the dangers of fallout. When asked about it, he replies, ―why worry about something you 
can‘t see, feel, hear, or smell… it‘s just as bad to frighten people to death as kill them with radia-
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tion…‖151 Accordingly, Mr. Offenhaus had been attracted to civil defense mainly because, ―At 
the time it seemed quite an honor.‖ Despite the prominence it brought upon him ―he had cons i-
dered civil defense a boondoggle, like handouts to foreign countries and spending millions on 
moon rockets and such.‖152  
 Alas, Babylon also mentions the conditioning aspects of civil defense on children, but 
like many other proponents of civil defense positions it in somewhat positive terms.  When He-
len (Mark‘s wife) mentions that her children are living relatively comfortable lives in a post-
nuclear environment, Randy replies that it is because ―They‘re conditioned.‖ He later mentions 
that, ―Maybe one day I‘ll get conditioned. I‘ll accept things, like the children.‖153  
Despite the negative depictions of civil defense administrators and the incompetence of 
the country‘s civil defense throughout Alas, Babylon, the novel overwhelmingly presents a pro 
civil defense message. Like many proponents of a ―real‖ civil defense program in the U.S. at the 
time, the novel urges greater participation from individuals while at the same time calling for a 
more expensive and comprehensive civil defense program. The message of Alas, Babylon was 
that this course should be taken and as soon as possible. According to one particularly didactic 
quote within the novel, ―This chaos did not result from a breakdown in Civil Defense. It was 
simply that Civil Defense, as a realistic buffer against thermonuclear war, did not exist. Evacua-
tion zones for entire cities had never been publicly announced, out of fear of ‗spreading alarm.‘ 
Only families of military personnel knew what to do, and where to go and assemble.‖154 In a 
sense, Alas, Babylon was a more recent and updated version of Tomorrow! This is particularly 
true when one inspects the conditions of nuclear war addressed in Alas, Babylon such as fallout, 
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the use of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, and the resulting firestorms. Despite these updated 
elements of nuclear weapons, some critics still found Frank‘s depictions of nuclear survival un-
convincing. As one reviewer explained, ―Survival, though hard… looks too easy…. As a post-
Bomb Swiss Family Robinson-type adventure, the story is fine, but my impression is that Frank 
stopped too soon with too little.‖155 These of course were all elements that Wylie later listed as 
his reasons for abandoning civil defense.  However, while Wylie dedicated his work to those 
working within civil defense, Frank depicts those within the program as opportunists in search of 
public recognition who are more concerned about causing panic than with saving lives. Although 
Alas, Babylon was highly supportive of the messages within civil defense and an idealized ver-
sion of the efforts, it nonetheless reads as a criticism of what civil defense looked like at the time. 
As noted by historian David Krugler, civil defense agencies had a history of being viewed as cor-
rupt and as being a prime location for appointing ones friends. 156 As described in chapter 2, these 
same criticisms of the various civil defense agencies also surfaced among opponents of the pro-
gram from the political right and left. 
4.3 Level 7 (1959) 
While Alas, Babylon largely reinforced the individualist centered and optimistic perspec-
tives of the OCDM and civil defense, Mordecai Roschwald‘s Level 7 could not have been more 
pointed in its attacks against civil defense and its rationales. The novel is presented as a journal 
written by a high level military personnel member who has been trained to carry out specific or-
ders for firing nuclear weapons. The majority of the book takes place within a massive unde r-
ground and self sufficient shelter system that has seven subterranean levels. The main character‘s 
nationality remains unknown throughout the book, leaving readers to guess whether this is a So-
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viet or American bunker. Roshwald took this approach specifically to criticize both U.S. and So-
viet policies during the nuclear arms race, even dedicating the book itself to ―Dwight and Nik i-
ta.‖ Like Alas, Babylon and On the Beach, Level 7 does not neglect to include the aspects of nuc-
lear fallout and the efficiency of nuclear missiles in his scenario. As the main character, known 
simply as X-127, continues through the novel, he increasingly questions his role and the impor-
tance and structure of the bunker.  
One of the most potent criticisms found within the book is the bunker‘s physical layout. 
Each level houses different people, and the higher levels (that are actually deeper in the earth) 
house the most important people. For example, level 7 contains only those who like X-127 are 
necessary to launch a nuclear attack. These then, are the people that the designers hoped to keep 
most safe. Those in level 6 are engaged with a nuclear missile defense system. Levels 5 to 3 in-
cluded elite civilians, politicians, and some military leaders. Then of course levels 1 and 2 in-
clude everyday civilians. Not only are the higher levels better protected from nuclear blasts and 
fallout, they are also better supplied and receive better treatment. The very setup of this bunker is 
a criticism of civil defense policy, especially the notion that military personnel and government 
officials would be able to make decisions in safer locations and conditions than those whom the 
decisions would affect most directly. This was particularly troublesome to many within civil de-
fense who felt that much more effort was being focused toward insuring a ―continuity of gov-
ernment‖ than on the everyday civilian. Although these concerns were also present within the 
U.S., this was especially apparent when a group of disarmament demonstrations in the U.K. 
chose to march to one of the supposedly classified regional bunkers and hold their rally on 
site.157  
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Although the bunker‘s very layout spoke volumes about the values that were given to dif-
ferent groups within society, the rest of the book solidifies this notion. Eventually X-127 is asked 
to carry out a nuclear strike by pushing a serious of buttons, representing the escalation of the 
war. Within the course of a few hours nearly everyone in the outside world is dead. Even shorter 
than the wars depicted in On the Beach and Alas, Babylon, this conflict lasts less than three 
hours. However, as the radioactive fallout continues to slowly spread throughout the world, X-
127 and others are able to pick up the occasional radio signals of neutral nations around the 
world slowly dying off. This is particularly distressing as people in levels 1 and 2 begin to slowly 
die as well. Eventually, each level begins to contract radiation poisoning until everyone, included 
X-127 himself is dead.  
Some of X-127‘s last thoughts are particularly revealing. During the time between the 
war and his death, he learns much more about the bunker and the world around him. To begin 
with, he realizes that the intercom voice that has been giving him commands is only a computer, 
not an actual person. This computer, like the ―doomsday machine‖ idea attributed to nuclear stra-
tegist Herman Kahn, was programmed to give specific commands according to particular situa-
tions. X-127 also learns that the war was started by an accidental misunderstanding between his 
and the enemy nation. As each level is gradually dying, bickering and fighting erupts between 
the different levels, especially within level 5 amongst policymakers. Finally, contact is made 
with the enemy nation, who has constructed a similar bunker and is also experiencing the gradual 
loss of life. Upon realizing the similarities, X-127 realizes, ―So the enemy‘s lot is similar to ours. 
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We have not been told exactly what their system of shelters was, but they are all graves except 
the military one, which must correspond to our Level 7.‖158 During one particularly thoughtful 
passage, X-127 realizes that, ―It has become so easy to destroy and kill. With a push-button a 
child, an innocent baby, could do it. In a sense, the idea that the present disaster happened be-
cause war became dehumanized may have something in it.‖159 He eventually decides that war 
was a slippery slope and that technology only enabled humans to carry the rationale behind war 
to its logical conclusion. Dwelling on the horrific world remaining, he remarks that, ―Dea th 
works fast. In a second it can kill a man, a thousand men, a million men. A thousand millions it 
can kill in one second. The pushing of a button can do it.‖160  As those within the shelter contin-
ue to die off, X-127 asks himself, ―So why should we be surprised if a shelter perishes, even one 
which looks completely safe? Look at what sometimes happened to submarines. And what are 
our levels but subterranean? Why should we consider ourselves so completely safe? Just because 
the surface is so fatally dangerous?‖161  
It seems that Roshwald held nothing back from his criticisms of civil defense and the 
very foundations that it stood upon including the nuclear arms race, the safety of shelters, the 
mechanization of warfare, and even the prioritization of people‘s lives within civil defense plan-
ning. Like Philip Wylie, Roshwald eventually aims his criticisms not only at nuclear weapons 
but even nuclear energy. Ironically, right before the death of X-127, the source of everyone‘s 
radiation poisoning is a leak in the nuclear reactors used to power the shelter.  
Unlike On the Beach or the writings of Philip Wylie, Level 7 does not seem to have 
created an enormous stir among civil defense administrators. It never reached the level of pop u-
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larity that On the Beach did, but it did embody some of the common criticisms made against civil 
defense, the arms race, and the advancing military technologies within the field of nuclear wea-
pons. The novel‘s message was certainly understood within the context of its timing as well. One 
reviewer reminded readers that, ―Governor Rockefeller of N.Y. has gone on record advocating 
bomb shelters for the common man. Roshwald‘s book is an extension of this idea of escape into 
a grave.‖162  Like the other novels, Level 7‘s fictional genre was under some dispute. As put suc-
cinctly by one reviewer, ―Well then, is this science fiction or not? I submit regretfully, that it is 
not…. When reviewers of such novels as Level 7, The Last Canticle, and On the Beach assure us 
that in spite of superficial resemblances, these are not really s.f. [science fiction], they are per-
fectly sincere, and they are right.‖163 In The New York Times a reviewer explained to readers that 
Level 7, ―is an earnest tract rather than a novel.‖164 Mordecai Roshwald was not a fiction writer, 
but an academic when he wrote Level 7. According to The New York Times reviewer, ―Mr. 
Roshwald‘s idea in delivering his grim message in fictional form doubtless was that a story 
would reach a greater audience than an article.‖165 Like Philip Wylie before him, Roshwald was 
highly educated about nuclear strategy, the technological advances in nuclear weaponry, and the 
effectiveness in spreading their messages through popular fiction. Indeed both men were contr i-
butors to The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists over the years, a magazine that had similar aims to 
broaden the public‘s knowledge on the dangers and implications of nuclear weapons and energy. 
While Roshwald was criticized for his writing style and even accused of ―the all too common 
mistake of trying to substitute intelligence for talent,‖ his work nevertheless attracted the e n-
dorsements of other prominent activist scientists such as Bertrand Russell and Linus Pauling. 
                                                                 
162
 Galaxy Science Fiction Magazine, February 1961, 41. 
163
 Damon Knight, ―Level 7,‖ The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction, July 1960, 78. 
164
 Robert. O Erisman, ―Pushbutton World,‖ New York Times, 13th March 1960, BR34. 
165
 Ibid. 
69 
The messages within Level 7, like many newspaper op-eds and opinions expressed by everyday 
people, were critical of civil defense policies ranging from the building of shelters to the priorit i-
zation of protecting the military and elite policymakers over themselves.  
4.4 Triumph (1963) 
If Philip Wylie had abandoned the prospects of civil defense, he certainly had not ceased 
thinking about it. Nearly three years after his statements in The Rotarian, Wylie decided to in-
scribe his opinions in yet another nuclear apocalyptic fiction. The differences between his de-
scriptions of nuclear warfare, civil defense efforts, and human psychology throughout each of his 
novels is worthy of a detailed description. Wylie, like Neville Shute, Mordecai Roshwald, and 
Pat Frank, was not exclusively or primarily a science fiction writer. Science fiction novels, then, 
provided an excellent vehicle for these writers to move their message to a broader audience. W y-
lie used his work Triumph to display not only the problems associated with the physical survival 
of a nuclear war, but also the psychological ramifications for the few who could manage that. 
Ironically, the messages within Triumph are in some ways inverted from those within Tomorrow! 
The characters in Tomorrow! primarily use civil defense to psychologically protect themselves, 
while being more vulnerable to the physical dangers of a nuclear war. In Triumph, the characters 
are conversely able to physically protect themselves (although, this process is much more diff i-
cult than the evacuation techniques in Tomorrow!) while succumbing to psychological terrors 
and struggles. According to one review of Triumph, Wylie had ―done some rethinking of the 
atomic holocaust story. The good little town that was saved in ‗Tomorrow!‘ because it kept up its 
civil defense program wouldn‘t stand a chance in this new war.‖166 
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In the pattern of the aforementioned nuclear apocalyptics, Triumph takes place in a re-
cognizable future where the United States and Soviet Union are each equipped with nuclear 
tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers. During this period a 
wealthy business magnate, Vance Farr, has a high end blast shelter built inside a mountain next 
to his mansion. While several of his friends and family happen to be visiting, a nuclear war 
breaks out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Farr then rushes all of his visitors into his 
shelter deep in the mountain as the world above them is being obliterated. Although initially 
there are only ten occupants in the shelter, not long after their submersion they rescue an addi-
tional four. In contrast to his book Tomorrow!, Philip Wylie doesn‘t attempt to conventionalize 
the effects of nuclear weapons in Triumph. Whereas Tomorrow! described nuclear weapons 
based on the elements of blast and heat, he now fully detailed the more unique effects. Triumph 
dedicates an entire five pages just to describing these effects to the reader, pointing out the same 
conditions that Wylie did in The Rotarian three years earlier. Some of these elements described 
include the initial radiation in the form of gamma rays, the blinding effects of a fireball, the ef-
fects of nuclear fallout (which was relatively minimized in Tomorrow!), and the implications that 
these would have on a typical home fallout shelter. For example, the book describes in detail 
both the asphyxiation and suffocation of those attempting to weather the attack in their basement 
shelters. In addition to this critique of home shelters, the novel also depicts the Soviet Union as 
staggering its attacks on the United States, therefore negating the current civil defense advice to 
be stocked with supplies for a period of two weeks. Probably the clearest portrayal of home fal-
lout shelters is given when Vance Farr and others rescue four additional characters in the book. 
During the construction of his deep shelter, Farr had an additional tunnel built underneath his 
mistress‘s house in a suburban neighborhood nearby. Although each of the homes in this neigh-
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borhood came with fallout shelters, the only people to survive include Farr‘s mistress, her lover, 
and two abandoned children. They too would have been asphyxiated had they not began making 
their way into the connecting subterranean tunnel. Farr‘s $200 million shelter proves to be in-
adequate over time, and the occupants are only saved after two years of waiting to be rescued by 
those South of the equator. Ben Bernman, the main protagonist throughout the book, is a forward 
thinking scientist who ponders that even the $200 million shelter was ― a refuge that had now 
been proven inadequate, owing to conditions no man, however imaginative, could have pre-
dicted.‖167 Although fictional, Wylie was able to present the reader with a clear argument against 
building a home fallout shelter.  
Although Triumph presents the reader with a fairly straightforward critique of civil de-
fense, Wylie‘s anti-Soviet Cold Warrior rhetoric had not receded a bit since Tomorrow! Indeed, 
several elements within the book point to the broader concerns being expressed in popular print 
media such as newspapers and magazines at the time. Two such examples are the superiority of 
the Soviet‘s nuclear arsenal (or the so called ―missile gap‖) and their civil defense program. Both 
of these components actually constitute the Soviets‘ rationale for striking first. After elaborate 
deep shelter civil defense plans, the Soviets purposefully blanket the Northern Hemisphere with 
radiation and wait for death to follow, including many within its own borders. Much like the rea-
soning behind the Soviet attack in Alas, Babylon this one occurs based on timing itself during the 
―gap‖ between U.S. and Soviet missile technologies. Much like Level 7 and several other works, 
Triumph even attacked the rationales and underpinning of civil defense policy. In one revealing 
instance, Ben Bernman proclaims that,  
…if the Pentagon, White House, Rand Corporation, civil-defense people and the rest ev-
er had taken a realistic view of a third war, they‘d have foreseen, at most, what your fa-
ther [Vance Farr] did. With the result that they‘d have realized it would cost abo ut ten 
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million bucks a person to shelter any part or all of the U.S. population for the at- least-
conceivable period of two years. And then that would have proven far too short a time. 
Wouldn‘t such a situation have put our so-called and long-deceased leaders in a tizzie!168 
 
Wylie then was fully aware of and pointing out the difficult situation that civil defense 
administrators must have found themselves in, the realization that fallout shelters would only 
work under a very strict set of circumstances that an enemy would be equally aware of. This then 
was the difficulty in preparing everyday Americans for the possibilities of nuclear war.  
4.5 Conclusion 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, popular opposition to civil defense programs was 
expressed not only through newspapers and magazines but was also embodied within popular 
fiction. These ―nuclear apocalyptic‖ novels expressed similar concerns as those writing in to 
their national and local newspapers. The level and direction of these criticisms, much like those 
expressed within newspapers, varied as well. Some novels such as Level 7 seem to criticize the 
core rationales behind civil defense head on. Roshwald‘s work confronts the reader with an im-
plied hierarchy of human lives within civil defense planning. Missiles and their operators were to 
be kept most secure, while politicians, military strategists, and scientists followed. Least impor-
tant of all within civil defense planning were everyday civilians. Unlike Alas, Babylon or Tri-
umph, however, Level 7 does not concern itself with national politics, leaving the reader guessing 
throughout the book which superpower they are reading about only to find out that each side has 
prepared similar shelters with presumably identical priorities. The message within Level 7 strikes 
at the roots of civil defense policies and their implications for nuclear strategy and foreign and 
domestic policies in general.  
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Less critical of civil defense itself, Alas, Babylon seemed to imply that civil defense had 
to be an individual effort. Not a criticism of civil defense itself, the work seemingly attacked the 
weaknesses within the program, especially within its administrative ranks. Alas, Babylon then 
seems to most closely correspond with the conservative criticisms of civil defense as a financial 
―boondoggle.‖ Accordingly, the money spent on these programs could better be spent in closing 
the perceived ―missile gap‖ during the time. Although this same concern for ―the missile gap‖ 
was expressed by Wylie as well, Triumph holds out no hope for the effectiveness of civil defense 
planning. His disillusion with civil defense was expressed both within popular newspapers and 
magazines as well as popular fiction. Also, Wylie increasingly focused his attention on the envi-
ronmental effects of nuclear weapons and would eventually transition his nuclear concerns into 
an overall fear for the well being of the planet. This transition was a common one throughout the 
mid to late 1960s, as anti-nuclear testing activists increasingly turned their attention to nuclear 
power and other energy sources.   
While it is the most vague in its references to civil defense, On the Beach overwhelming-
ly concerned civil defense proponents the most out of each of the nuclear apocalyptics. The asto-
nishing popularity of the novel and its subsequent film concerned civil defense administrators 
enough that they found it necessary to address it regularly. This was done within newspaper and 
magazine columns, agency newsletters, and even training seminars. The deadliest message of all, 
according to administrators, was that it was better to die than to dig. Whether they believed civil 
defense was necessary for ―psychologically hardening‖ the public or for physically protecting 
them, they were increasingly frustrated by the ever more devastating effects of nuclear weapons.  
The response to these criticisms aimed at civil defense became overwhelming. Public op-
position to the programs would eventually cripple even the most ardent supporters. Throughout 
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the mid to late 1960s, civil defense began to focus much more on the less controversial aspects of 
its programs, especially on natural disasters. Much like the anti-nuclear testing activists in the 
late 1950s, civil defense too became increasingly concerned with environmental concerns and 
less so with man-made ones. Print media played a large role throughout this process. Newspapers 
and magazines allowed everyday Americans to voice their concerns over civil defense. These 
concerns were also expressed by writers of popular fiction and further disseminated to a broader 
readership. These same tools were used by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization 
throughout its existence. Nevertheless, for many readers the images of cozy fallout shelters filled 
with serene nuclear families accompanied by articles encouraging private shelter building did not 
go uncontested. The reaction to these programs and the rationales underpinning them were both 
prominent and significant. 
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5 CONCLUSION: MISSILE DEFENSE, THE NEW CIVIL DEFENSE? 
After Philip Wylie carefully detailed the failures of civil defense in his damning Rotarian 
article as well as his novel Triumph, a few years later he took aim at another form of nuclear de-
fense, Secretary of State McNamara‘s ―thin shield‖ anti-ballistic missile program. Published in 
the January 1968 issue of Popular Science, Wylie explained to his readers each component of the 
―thin shield‖ program as well as its purpose : to protect the U.S. from Chinese ICBMs. Wylie 
then criticized the program for its probability of juggernauting costs, its impotency in the case of 
a high altitude nuclear attack causing an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and the problem of the 
system being outdated by the time of its completion. Not necessarily a fiscal conservative, Wylie 
conceded in the article that ―cost is not meaningful if the program offers reliable protection.‖169 
Of course, even spending on security has to pass some sort of cost-benefit analysis, and for Wy-
lie, the ―thin shield‖ system simply did not. Further, and probab ly most important to his argu-
ment, Wylie argued that as the ―thin shield‖ system admittedly could not protect the U.S. from 
competent Soviet ICBMs, it was only a matter of time before the system was obsolete. Finally, 
Wylie condemned the system to ―no more than a double Maginot Line‖ a term that was used to 
criticize civil defense only a few years prior.170  
5.1 Nuclear Defense Systems 
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, there existed a general consensus among 
military and nuclear strategists, political elites, and anti-nuclear activists that civil defense and 
missile defense programs were interconnected.  In looking at how these two programs were 
viewed by each of these groups, one uncovers a variety of different rationales for thinking about 
the systems as connected. The most revealing aspect of these systems is the way that both the 
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proponents and opponents of them seemingly redeployed the arguments over civil defense in the 
1950s when discussing missile defense in the late 1960s. By looking at the continuities in these 
debates, the opposition against missile defense reveals itself as highly influenced by the earlier 
activism aimed at civil defense programs, mapping out an important link between anti-war pro-
test in the 1950s with that of the 1960s. Finally, as civil defense became less popular among the 
American public and legislators, it became a useful precedent for discussions over missile de-
fense. Through this process, civil defense and missile defense were continually entangled. The 
interconnectedness of these two programs circumscribed the possibilities of nuclear strategy and 
missile defense technology in the future.  
5.2 Nuclear Strategists – Active and Passive Defense 
When thinking about the possibilities of a nuclear war, strategists constructed a couple of 
helpful terms to better their understanding of military components. First, strategists made a dis-
tinction between offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive weapons included the nuclear 
triad, or bombers, submarines, and eventually missiles. These of course were countered with de-
fensive capabilities. In speaking of these capabilities, strategists worried about the eclipsing of 
defense by offense. In his 1960 work On Thermonuclear War, Herman Kahn explained that, ―Pa-
rochial or uninformed people sometimes measure our offensive power – our power to regulate 
enemy behavior – just in terms of the number, quality, and operational capability of the offensive 
vehicles we own. Actually, our ability to regulate enemy behavior depends as much, if not more, 
on our active and passive defensive capability as on our offensive capability.‖171 Kahn hoped to 
highlight the importance of nuclear defense as it had previously been neglected. In doing so, he 
delineated two different types of defensive capabilities: active and passive. Each of these de-
fenses had more specific identities when explored further. When writing of passive defense, this 
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almost always meant civil defense.172 Active defense, on the other hand, generally includes any 
effort to disarm an enemy attack after it has been launched. This then, could include air defense 
by manned aircraft or an anti-ballistic missile system.173 While passive defense almost always 
equated to civil defense, active defense may refer to the Strategic Air Command or missile de-
fense systems and must be understood within the time frame of its invocation.  
According to Kahn, active defense was essential to passive defense and vice versa. These 
defenses were viewed as essential to protecting a nation from complete annihilation. Speaking 
for RAND, Kahn explained that, ―it is our conjecture that… feasible combinations of active de-
fense, active offense, and nonmilitary defense can, with at least medium confidence if not with 
high confidence, protect a nation in the sense that without these measures the nation may be a l-
most totally destroyed.‖174 As these systems would all fortify and support each other, they would 
theoretically provide safety for the American public. According to Kahn, air defense in the form 
of Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases or Intercontinental Ballistic Missile sites would force the 
enemy to give these spaces a higher priority for attacks than on cities. This was true because, if 
these sites were spared, then the enemy would have to absorb their counter attack soon after-
wards. This situation would result in cities being spared and therefore a civil defense program 
could offer protection from the radioactivity upwind at the SAC bases or ICBM sites. 175 In this 
way, active and passive defense were to work together to provide safety to the U.S. On Thermo-
nuclear War is important for understanding the links between civil and missile defense as it was 
written in 1960. At this point, civil defense was receiving a popular backlash against its pro-
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grams and the ideas for implementing a missile defense were just beginning to take off. For 
Kahn, the active defenses carried the same responsibilities for protecting Americans against 
enemy attacks. Always willing to venture into the unknown, Kahn even postulated that eventual-
ly ABMs would be an important aspect of active defenses. 176 Nonetheless, On Thermonuclear 
War reveals how the systems of civil and air defense (as the predecessor of missile defense) were 
to work together in softening a nuclear strike from an enemy attack. 
Herman Kahn stands out not only for his works as a nuclear strategist, but for his broader 
association with the RAND Corporation. The majority of Kahn‘s research for On Thermonuclear 
War was taken from a surfeit of RAND studies.177 RAND, an acronym for Research and Devel-
opment, was formed to advise the Air Force in 1946. Just a couple of years later, RAND evolved 
from a project into a non-profit corporation, becoming RAND Corporation.178 Offering advice on 
a plethora of subjects RAND was heavily involved in studies of both civil and missile defense 
programs. In its own history under the title of ―nuclear weapons‖ RAND pointed out that, 
―RAND has investigated other means for limiting war damage should deterrence fail. Prominent 
among them is civil defense. Much can be done to alleviate the consequences of even total war, 
if all kinds of defense, including passive defense, are used.‖179 With regards to missile defense 
RAND‘s history also takes plenty of credit noting that by 1954, ―Rand had begun work on ICBM 
defense studies, with results applicable to the ballistic-missile early-warning system and to the 
problems, for offense and defense, of ICBM decoys.‖180 Producing an array of studies using a 
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variety of theories and methods (including John von Neumann‘s Game Theory), RAND had a 
direct effect on military strategy in the United States.  
For nuclear strategists such as Kahn, civil defense was linked with air defense and later 
missile defense through an intricate series of assumptions based on theoretical models. In this 
case, air defense and later missile defense sites offered the enemy an irresistible target that in 
turn would spare civilians from a direct attack by the enemy. Further, civil defense‘s vulnerabili-
ty to a direct attack was unimportant as it would only need to provide defense against the effects 
of nuclear fallout. In this way, nuclear strategists viewed each system as a valuable component in 
providing strength and safety to the United States. Further, the linking of these programs soon 
became absorbed by political elites who were looking at the possibilities of implementing a mis-
sile defense just a few years after Kahn‘s On Thermonuclear War.  
5.3 Political Elites – Robert McNamara  
Think tanks such as RAND influenced political elites as they were responsible for mak-
ing influential decisions about nuclear defense systems. One excellent example of this was Ro-
bert McNamara‘s decision to support a ―thin shield‘ anti-ballistic missile system during the 
Johnson Administration.181 It should be noted that McNamara‘s program differed from a ―thick 
shield‖ program because it sought to create a system that could only provide safety from a few 
incoming missiles (in this case the focus was on China). McNamara supported this because it 
was cheaper than a ―thick shield‖ program and considered such a program to be unachievable. 
Intense pressure from President Johnson also played heavily on McNamara support for such a 
system.182 As political scientist Ernest Yanarella explained, ―In describing the relationship of a 
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fallout shelter program to any ABM effort, McNamara stressed the inextricable link between the 
two.‖183 Accordingly, McNamara was concerned that without a civil defense program ABM 
would be counterproductive. This is because anti-ballistic missiles during the 1960s and 1970s 
were composed of nuclear tipped warheads. This then meant that even if an incoming missile 
could be intercepted it would still result in an abundance of nuclear fallout. Further, McNamara 
was concerned about the possibility of enemy missiles detonating prior to being within range of 
ABM systems so that they could simply ―saturate civilian population centers with highly ra-
dioactive fog.‖184 In many ways, McNamara even supported civil defense over missile defense 
explaining that, ―I personally will never recommend an anti-ICBM program unless a fallout pro-
gram does accompany it. I believe that even if we do not have an anti-ICBM program, we none-
theless should proceed with the fallout shelter program.‖185 Eventually, McNamara would have 
to concede on this point as neither the public nor Congress would accept civil defense by the mid 
1960s. Nonetheless, McNamara‘s viewpoint of civil defense largely mirrors that of earlier nuc-
lear strategists such as Herman Kahn.  
The continuities between Kahn and McNamara‘s strategic thinking should be hig-
hlighted. Kahn, writing in an earlier time focused on the importance of active defense in diver t-
ing enemy attention away from cities and towards SAC bases and ICBM sites. This diversion 
would theoretically make civil defense worthwhile as it would now be able to provide fallout 
protection to civilians downwind from these sites. In McNamara‘s case, ABM sites added a new 
element by protecting the SAC bases and ICBM sites. Much like nuclear strategists before him, 
McNamara supported a linkage between the two systems working in a scheme to provide safety 
to the American public. McNamara believed that if the Anti-Ballistic Missile systems could 
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prove feasible, it would only work within the grand strategy if the population could find a way to 
avoid the radiation poisoning left behind.  
5.4 Anti-nuclear Activists – Jerome Wiesner 
The link between civil and missile defenses was not only asserted by nuclear strategists 
and political elites who supported the programs, but also by those who hoped to impede them. 
During the heavy debates over McNamara‘s ―thin shield‖ program for an ABM system, anti-
nuclear activists and arms race opponents sought to tie the two programs together for their own 
purposes. In 1969, in the midst of the debates over McNamara‘s ―thin shield‖ program, the 
Washington Post had an advertisement for a book discussing the ABM system. The ad cited the 
book‘s author Jerome B. Wiesner as asking, ―When did we stop believing we could be safe in 
fallout shelters? We were all taken in, for an instant anyway. It was a mass delusion, but we 
wanted to believe we could still do something. Remember? Well, now, what do you think about 
the ABM?‖186 Wiesner, as did other critics of missile defense, tied its problematic nature to the 
earlier troubles of civil defense as each sought to convince Americans that ―something‖ could be 
done, other than full disarmament, to protect them from the possibility of dangers associated with 
a nuclear holocaust.187  
In hoping to tie their arguments against McNamara‘s ABM proposals to those of civil de-
fense earlier, anti-nuclear activists were setting up civil defense as a straw man ready to pummel. 
In looking at the arguments that were made for supporting McNamara‘s ―thin shield‖ system, the 
link between it and civil defense must have come very naturally to anti-ABM activists. In many 
ways, the arguments for civil defense were simply re-used in defense of an ABM program. Both 
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programs essentially argued that they would only provide a limited amount of security and only 
in specific situations. For civil defense, it would only work if a shelter was far distanced from 
ground zero. For ―thin shield,‖ the system could not possibly defend a serious nuclear attack as it 
would be overpowered by an abundance of incoming missiles loaded with multiple warheads and 
possibly even decoys. Both systems also claimed that they were necessary for avoiding ―nuclear 
blackmail‖ by an enemy. This idea traced back to RAND‘s studies on the importance of passive 
and active defenses and the importance of avoiding a ‗‗free ride‘‘ for enemies to attack. 188 If you 
could provide your cities with some form of defense either civil or missile, then an enemy could 
not make threats about the destruction of these cities in order to gain negotiation power. Insur-
ance was also often used as a metaphor for justifying each of the systems. In this way, both sys-
tems hoped to dodge the idea that by building the systems, they were encouraging a war. It is 
precisely because missile defense used many of the same arguments that ABM opponents sought 
to re-use their arguments as well. Besides, these were the same arguments that helped to put civil 
defense in its grave. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Nuclear strategists, political elites, and anti-nuclear activists each found good reason to 
view civil and missile defense programs as interconnected. Nonetheless, their reasons for this 
greatly differed. Nuclear strategists such as Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation viewed 
the two programs as working together to keep U.S. cities from being targeted directly and then 
providing these cities with protection from downwind fallout. Later on, political elites such as 
Robert McNamara would adopt the research of nuclear strategists and continue to assert the im-
portance of civil defense if missile defense was to work. However, by the time that Robert 
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McNamara was trying to reassert this connectedness, civil defense had been largely opposed by 
the public and legislators alike.  
Anti-nuclear activists during the ―Great ABM Debate‖ also sought to reassert the inter-
connectedness of the two systems in an effort to discredit the rhetoric of proponents of ―thin 
shield.‖189 They recognized that missile defense arguments largely mirrored those of civil de-
fense earlier and sought to demonstrate that missile defense was simply the new civil defense. 
The interconnected nature of civil and missile defense has continued to wield a powerful impact 
on nuclear strategy and ABM systems. The opponents to civil defense programs in the 1950s left 
much more impact on nuclear strategy than they may have imagined. Not only shutting down the 
civil defense programs of the 1950s, their rhetoric was somewhat successfully redeployed 
against McNamara‘s ABM program a decade later.  
Without civil defense, missile defense found itself more difficult to justify as it would 
possibly endanger nearby residents with radioactive fallout, even if it could work. In destroying 
civil defense, opponents also crippled missile defense. Although missile defense has persisted 
since the 1960s, these programs have found themselves circumscribed by a lack of civil defense 
programs. For example, McNamara‘s ―thin shield‖ program was canceled within a year of be-
coming operational. This cancellation was based over concern about its viability as well as the 
ramifications of having nuclear tipped warheads. There was concern over the effects of these 
warheads on radar systems and ―unnerved populations on the ground.‖190 Once again, civil de-
fense was the hoped for answer to psychologically hardening and physically protecting the pop u-
lation from radioactive fallout. Indeed, the impacts of opposition against civil defense have 
                                                                 
189
 Frank J. Johnson, ―ABM: The Great Debate,‖ The National Review, July 29, 1969, 756. 
190
 Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America From Missile Attack , 1st ed. (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2001), 12.  
84 
lasted from the failure of ―thin shield‖ to President Ronald Reagan‘s Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) and even into the present.  
Having to work around the long-term effects of civil defense opposition in the 1950s, 
missile defense programs have moved toward kinetic energy or laser type defenses. This is most 
clearly manifested in Reagan‘s laser based ―Star Wars‖ system and the more recent move to a 
―hit to kill‖ ABM system that would leave no radioactive fallout. In 1982, the Army showcased 
this technology in its Homing Overlay Experiment, the first in a continuing line of kinetic energy 
rooted programs seeking to demonstrate the viability of ―hit to kill‖ technology. 191 This technol-
ogy seeks to collide directly with an incoming missile, smash it, and render the nuclear device 
incapable of detonation. These technologies have proven very difficult (many argue impossible) 
to achieve. Had civil defense programs been able to convince Americans of the viability of fa l-
lout shelters, the archaic missile defense systems such as ―thin shield‖ would have speculatively 
been easier to achieve, since the prevention of fallout would be less important. Through marches, 
―die-ins,‖ and print-media, opponents to civil defense were able to eventually discredit the pro-
grams. By doing so, they circumscribed the possibilities for missile defense in the future. Their 
opposition confirmed to leaders that most Americans were not willing to support nuclear defense 
within their homes. Demonstrating the importance of popular opinion against these programs and 
ideas, anti-nuclear activists throughout the post-war period dramatically circumscribed the para-
meters of nuclear strategy. By doing so, this restricted nuclear strategy and directly impacted the 
path of research for anti-ballistic missile systems and other technologies of war. The legacy of 
anti civil defense successes were not only manifest through the restraint of nuclear policies dur-
ing the Cold War period, but have clearly extended those restraints into the present.  
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS 
ABM – Anti Ballistic Missile  
CONELRAD – Control of Electromagnetic Radiation 
EMP – Electromagnetic Pulse 
FCDA – Federal Civil Defense Agency 
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
NORAD – North American Air Defense Command 
OCD – Office of Civil Defense 
OCDM – Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization 
OPAL – Operation Alert 
RAND – Research and Development 
SAC – Strategic Air Command 
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